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Abstract 
This thesis documents and analyzes the major trends of the military, political, economic, and 
cultural relationships between Denmark and Russia from 1989 to 2019. I document the 
relationship from the Danish perspective, using primary sources, with the aim to conduct 
analysis of Danish politicians’ speeches and activities during this period. The outcome is a 
comprehensive image of the Danish-Russian bilateral relationship at the present time. This 
relationship has fluctuated widely during the time period under study. Shared economic 
development interests in the 1990s contributed to a positive relationship; controversy 
surrounding the war in Chechnya and an assertive Danish prime minister caused a severe 
downturn in relations during the 2000s; between 2009 and 2014, Danish economic interests took 
top priority and helped salvage the relationship with Russia; but following what the West 
perceived as Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2014, combined with developments in the 
European energy sector, we are now seeing another low period in the Danish-Russian 
relationship. The fact that Denmark plays a key role in the linkages between European energy 
security and expansion of Russian energy exports, and has through its connection with Greenland 
a voice in the issues of sovereignty and access in the Arctic, competition over which is only 
going to increase in the coming years, underscores the importance of understanding this 
relationship. 
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Introduction 
 
 In August 2019, American president Donald Trump approached the newly-elected 
Danish prime minister, Mette Frederiksen, with a real estate opportunity: he wanted to buy the 
autonomous Danish territory of Greenland. Frederiksen was, at the time, visiting Greenland. 
“This is an absurd discussion,” she told reporters.1 “I persistently hope that this was not meant 
seriously.”2 Trump called her response “nasty”, before lashing out against Denmark on Twitter 
and attacking the country’s NATO spending for not being high enough.3 He then canceled his 
upcoming state visit to Denmark, planned for the following month. This episode came seemingly 
out of nowhere and was widely ridiculed around the world. It also had the potential to be a 
confusing case for many casual American onlookers – as a small country, Denmark is often 
overlooked on the international stage, especially in the American perspective. However, looking 
past the jokes and incredulous reactions that ran rampant following Trump’s proposal, this 
episode actually serves as a near-perfect microcosm of Denmark’s bilateral relationship with a 
country that was not directly involved in the August drama: Russia. 
 Greenland, an island of over 800,000 square miles, is a highly strategic chip for 
Denmark, which on its own is only around 16,000 square miles. Denmark is also located some 
eight hundred miles from the Arctic Circle, while parts of Greenland are themselves located in 
the Arctic Circle. Greenland gives Denmark a voice in Arctic issues where it otherwise would 
have none. The Arctic is a region with rapidly growing significance to the rest of the world – as 
climate change takes its toll on the planet and melts more and more Arctic ice, new shipping 
 
1 Frederiksen qtd. in Kielgast 2019. 
2 Frederiksen qtd. in Juncher Jørgensen 2019. 
3 Trump qtd. in Baker and Haberman 2019; Trump 2019. 
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lanes in the High North and new opportunities for drilling natural gas and oil are opening up. 
These openings are of high interest to, among other actors, both the United States and Russia. 
Greenland is centrally located within these areas of interest. The territory is also home to a 
massive US Air Force base, Thule, and is covered by NATO defense guarantees, due to its 
connection to Denmark.  
This also makes Greenland, and Denmark by extension, an important piece to the military 
armament taking place in the Arctic between the US and Russia. Denmark and the US are 
longstanding military allies, and furthermore are inextricably linked by their shared NATO 
membership. It is thereby assumed that Denmark’s possession of Greenland (which, again, is 
already home to a sizeable US military presence, and has been for decades) is automatically and 
already to the benefit of the US. The advantage that Trump perceived in the purchase of 
Greenland is, both theoretically and practically, already there and available to the US. The 
extension of the offer to buy Greenland clearly indicates that this assessment is not shared by the 
American president. Trump does not view Denmark as a reliable strategic ally in this region of 
the world, nor does he value strategically the relationship Denmark has with Russia.  
Russia also arguably does not assign great strategic value to its relationship with 
Denmark. In addition to Denmark’s positioning in Arctic issues, this is also despite Denmark’s 
central positioning to the expansion of Russian energy interests in Western Europe. The laying of 
the Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines on the bottom of the Baltic Sea are perceived 
by much of Eastern and Northern Europe to be a massive geopolitical threat, as it will increase 
European dependency upon Russian energy resources and decrease European energy security.4 
 
4 Barteczko 2019; ERR 2018; Latvian Public Broadcasting 2018; Hnatyuk 2019; Laurenson 2020; Williams and 
Soldatkin 2019. 
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Denmark chose not to reject Nord Stream and was forced by law to accept Nord Stream 2, but 
remains centrally located in this key strategic neighborhood region, in which Russia also has 
vital interests and an interest in cooperation.  
Between the Arctic and the Baltic, Denmark is a key player in both regions – it still 
continues to be undervalued and overlooked by its larger neighbors in these areas, particularly 
Russia. The relationship between the two countries has fluctuated significantly over the past 
thirty years, since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Tracking and analyzing how a relationship 
came to be is essential to understanding new developments within and around the relationship, as 
well as how its various components may be deployed or instrumentalized in the future. Outside 
of Denmark, and to a certain extent even within Denmark, there is little scholarly work tracing 
the real development and evolution of this bilateral relationship. This thesis seeks to do so, with a 
perspective situating Denmark at the nexus of collective and energy security in Europe.  
Russia is one of the single most influential actors upon collective security, energy 
security, and their intersection; despite its tendency to be marginalized in international matters, 
Denmark is an influential part of this too. Access by anyone to knowledge about the varying 
relationships at play in this region will be instrumental in keeping well-informed, wide-
perspective diplomacy at the forefront of today’s resurgence of Cold War politics. As military 
armament and the race for resources pick up real speed in the Arctic, peaceful international 
cooperation and intensive dialogue are going to be of supreme importance to ensure that existing 
tensions and power dynamics in mainland Europe do not escalate into something worse in the 
High North. The chosen title of this thesis, Tinderbox, draws from a story written by famous 
Danish author Hans Christian Andersen and is intended to reflect the propensity for flares in 
conflict between Denmark and Russia, given the dynamics mentioned here. 
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This thesis follows a precise structure designed to build out my thematic findings from 
my research. The first body chapter reviews relevant events in Danish history from the 19th 
century onwards; some of these events take place in the context of Danish-Russian or Danish-
Soviet relations, but others are limited to Danish experiences. The history chapter lays out the 
major foundations upon which the following chapters and insights are based. These are, broadly 
stated, Denmark’s historical experiences as a small state surrounded by large neighbors; 
Denmark’s transformative experiences with energy insecurity in the 1970s; and the alliance 
structures to which Denmark belongs, as well as Russian perceptions of and reactions to these 
structures. The literature review follows the history section, as many of the meaningful events 
that feature in the reviewed literature require certain historical context, which the history sections 
seeks to establish for the reader. The theoretical frameworks discussed, and subsequently the 
larger framework that this thesis develops and employs, all work within the broadly stated major 
foundations laid out in the history chapter.  
Each of the following body chapters focuses on the theme of an individual foundation. 
Military relations are the focus of the chapter immediately following the literature review. I find 
Denmark’s membership of and commitment to NATO to be a defining pillar of Danish-Russian 
relations, due to the opposing strategic aims of NATO and of Russia as unitary military actors; 
this incompatibility, combined with Denmark’s key strategic location relative to Russia in the 
Baltic Sea, heightens the risk of bilateral conflict catalyzed by the two countries’ military 
relationship. There has, however, been meaningful cooperation between the two in this area as 
well.  
Political relations are the focus of the next chapter, because political opinions about 
Russia in Denmark have historically been informed to a high degree by military realities, even 
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when these realities did not directly involve Denmark; Denmark is highly pragmatic when it 
comes to this area of relations with Russia. Russia’s wars in Chechnya served as turning points 
in how Danish politicians perceived and spoke of Russia and its government, and in turn became 
the values frame which shaped the Danish side of the political relationship for most of the 2000s.  
Increased cooperation between the Danish and Russian economic sectors, specifically 
with regards to the energy industry, corresponded to a change in Denmark’s strategic priorities 
and perceptions regarding Russia. The economic chapter therefore follows the political chapter. 
For approximately a decade bridging the 2000s and 2010s, economic priorities were the guiding 
ones on Denmark’s side of the relationship; other political and economic concerns were largely 
pushed to the wayside. These concerns were resurrected in the mid-2010s and subsequently 
altered economic priorities once more, which brought a return to the colder relationship we see at 
the present.  
The final body chapter discusses cultural relations, chiefly how Russia appears in Danish 
popular media; the intersection of culture, sports, and politics in their relationship; and 
concluding with a brief look at Russia’s cultural cooperation mission in Denmark. 
Methodology 
 
In this thesis, I will document and analyze the major events, influences, and turning 
points in the Danish-Russian relationship across four broad components of the relationship: 
military, political, economic, and cultural. I will do so using open-source material, primarily 
public statements by Danish officials and archival policy and parliamentary documents from the 
Danish government, as well as Danish popular and journalistic media. I analyze discursive 
structures and changes over time and work through an individual-based approach to international 
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relations. The information gathered primarily focuses on the period of time between 1989 and 
2019. My presentation and analysis of this information will create a comprehensive map of how 
this relationship evolved from optimistic, values-driven cooperation in the 1990s to a 
confrontational, historicized distancing in the 2000s, and from there to the 2010s’ corporate-
based artificial peace and subsequent resurrection of Cold War politics. 
As a native Danish speaker, all translation of materials has been done myself; this does, 
however, limit the scope of my research and my topic to the Danish perspective of this bilateral 
relationship. A brief note regarding translation and interpretation concerns Danish naming 
conventions – in Denmark, due to a high volume of identical first and last name combinations, 
many people utilize their middle name or second surname, such as Anders Fogh Rasmussen, to 
distinguish themselves. In Danish, he would be referred to as Rasmussen, or Anders Fogh in a 
more casual setting; Fogh Rasmussen would only be used if there were another Rasmussen also 
referenced at the same time (for example, in a comparison of Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Lars 
Løkke Rasmussen). However, for the greatest ease of reading by a non-Danish audience, in this 
thesis I refer where possible to people by their middle and last names (Fogh Rasmussen), as there 
are many people referenced in this thesis with the same last names and this method of reference 
is least likely to cause confusion. 
The bulk of the primary sources utilized in the research for this thesis came from the 
Danish parliament’s digital archive, which can be found at the web address ft.dk, and from 
archived speeches made by Denmark’s prime ministers, which can largely be found at the web 
address stm.dk. The archive contains records, both complete and partial, of parliamentary 
debates, legislative proposals and resolutions, and questions posed to ministers by members of 
parliament. Part of the analytical value of these records lies in their reflection of not only 
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measures that succeeded, but also measures that failed or were revised significantly; all iterations 
provide information about discussions and concerns that were had at some point, and therefore 
provide a fuller picture than if one were to draw only upon laws that succeeded in passing.  
Records of debates, questions to ministers, and prime minister speeches are equally 
valuable because they provide much of the human dimension to the foreign policy decisions laid 
out by legislation. It is important that foreign policy analysis account for the real personalities 
and relationships of the people behind the policies. These more human contexts can be 
overlooked with relative ease, but in my view, it is a mistake to do so; I therefore attempt to keep 
central the human components of policy formation and diplomacy, wherever possible. 
In addition to a range of nonfiction books about broader NATO-Russia and West-Russia 
relations written by experts in their respective fields, this thesis draws upon a number of fiction 
novels from Danish authors and works of film or television that relate peripherally or 
contextually to my primary topic. I already knew of and had consumed many of these works 
prior to beginning work on my thesis; therefore, part of my research process involved thinking 
back on books I had read or films I had watched out of personal interest in the past, and how they 
related either directly to Danish-Russian relations or proximally to context surrounding the 
relationship. I am half Danish and, as was mentioned previously in this section, am a native 
Danish speaker. These details are key to my research process, as the vast majority of sources for 
my research are not currently available in English. 
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History and Background 
“Life is understood backwards but lived forwards.” - Søren Kierkegaard 5 
Contemporary narratives of Danish history often prioritize one year in their stories: 1864. 
This was the year that cemented Denmark’s fall from grace as a powerful nation of roving 
seafarers that dominated the seas to the north. Some years prior, Denmark and the German 
Confederation fought a three-year war from 1848 to 1851 over the territory comprising present-
day Denmark’s southern border and Germany’s northern one. This territory, the two duchies of 
Schleswig and Holstein, was contested because of the large and mixed populations of both 
Germans and Danes that lived here. The war in 1848 was fought for control over Schleswig-
Holstein and Denmark came out victorious over the secessionists, in part due to the support that 
Russia, alongside Britain and France, had offered Denmark against the Prussians. Kiel, a key 
gateway port to the Baltic Sea, is located in Holstein and the Russians preferred it to be in 
Danish rather than German hands. The 1852 London Accords affirmed the Danish victory, but 
also included the condition that neither duchy could be constitutionally linked to the Danish 
state.  
These seemingly clear legal guidelines were followed closely by the Danish government 
for about nine years, until King Christian IX allowed himself to be pressured by the Danish 
people into signing the November Constitution of 1863. This constitution was written to include 
Schleswig, which also meant that it was written in violation of international law under the 1852 
peace accords. The violation gave Prussian Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck the opening he 
both needed and wanted to declare war on Denmark. The war lasted from Christmas Eve in 1863 
 
5 Kierkegaard 1843. 
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until the summer of 1864 – a much quicker affair than the 1848 First Schleswig War, and a much 
more brutal one. Aid by Denmark’s allies helped secure its victory in 1851, but this time help 
never materialized, despite promises by both Norway and Sweden to send assistance. Denmark 
suffered an abysmal defeat at the hands of its stronger southern neighbors and lost forty percent 
of its territory, which it never fully regained. Only Northern Schleswig would rejoin the Danish 
kingdom after the conclusion of World War I. From 1864 onwards, Denmark was consigned to 
almost a century of submission. 
The next key part of the story begins on April 9th, 1940. The evening before, Danish 
military intelligence on the southern border with Germany reported German military movement 
near the border, but it was assumed to be a drill – Denmark had signed a non-aggression pact 
with Germany in 1939. Early in the morning of the 9th, it became quickly clear that the German 
movements were not a drill; they were war. The Danish troops stationed along the border were 
mobilized, but were much weaker than the incoming German troops. Their poor training and 
equipment combined with the utter surprise of this unexpected entrance into war and led to the 
total capitulation of the Danish state within just a few hours. Denmark remained under the heel 
of the Nazis until 1945 and was under direct military occupation from 1943 to 1945, and 
although the government pursued a policy of cooperation with the Nazis, Danes were able to 
successfully evacuate almost all of the country’s Jews safely to Sweden, as well as carry out a 
coordinated resistance movement against the occupying forces.  
The British army was responsible for most of Denmark’s liberation in the spring of 1945, 
aside from the eastern Danish island of Bornholm. Bornholm was liberated by the Soviet Red 
Army at the same time. An internal memo from M. Vetrov, a member of the Soviet foreign 
affairs committee, to Vladimir Dekanozov, a deputy foreign minister, on April 2, 1945, laid out 
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the importance of Soviet naval forces being the first to liberate and occupy Bornholm, which was 
strategically located the furthest east into the Baltic Sea of all of Denmark’s territories. Citing 
Denmark’s position as a “guard post” at the juncture between the Baltic and the Atlantic, Vetrov 
wrote to his colleague, “On the basis of our occupation of Bornholm, [we should] proceed to the 
practical signing of a Soviet-Danish military agreement that gives us unconditional right to 
participate with our High Command in the exercise of the highest responsible authority in 
Denmark, until a Danish government is formed with the free will of the Danish people.”6  
At the same time, Major General Richard Dewing, who was heading up the Allied 
mission to Denmark, told army personnel, “Russia is displaying political interests in Denmark, 
and we must, in the common areas we have with them, try not to step on their toes.”7 
Additionally, miscommunications by a key Danish representative to the Soviet Union, Thomas 
Døssing, mistakenly gave the Allies the belief that there existed an agreement between Denmark 
and the Soviet Union that the latter could take control of Bornholm. 
So, while the rest of Denmark spent May of 1945 celebrating the Allied victory and the 
Nazi surrender, Bornholm Danes were having a very different experience. They first suffered an 
intensive Soviet bombing campaign that left much of the island in ruin – then they were 
forgotten by their countrymen. All told, the Red Army would remain on Bornholm for almost an 
entire year after the war ended for everybody else. During this period, Soviet soldiers regularly 
raped, assaulted, robbed, and burglarized the people of Bornholm, and there seemed to be very 
little recognition of this reality coming from news in mainland Denmark.8 This became a 
 
6 Hornemann 2006, p. 54. 
7 Hornemann 2006, p. 60. 
8 Gaarskjær 2012, 40. 
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politically uncomfortable situation for the Danish government, as time passed and troops of other 
foreign nations had already gone home but the Red Army remained.  
Finally, the Danish foreign minister Gustav Rasmussen brought the issue up with the 
Soviet deputy foreign minister, Andrey Vyshinskyy, when the two met in London in February 
1946. “I had said I was convinced that the Soviet Union did not have a hidden agenda towards 
Denmark, but had to emphasize that the troops’ recall would remove the last reason for mistrust 
of the Soviet Union that the Danish public had,” Rasmussen recounted in his notes of the 
meeting.9 Døssing, the Danish envoy to the Soviet Union, finally brought a letter to Soviet 
foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov that formally requested a recall of the Soviet troops, 
several months later.10 Molotov responded, “If Denmark is prepared to take over the island of 
Bornholm with its own troops and set up its own administration, without any participation of 
foreign troops and foreign administrators, then the Soviet government will recall its troops from 
Bornholm and give the island over to the Danish state.”11 The Red Army went home in the 
spring of 1946. Its extended occupation, however, caused uncertainty among the politicians back 
in Copenhagen and real trauma among the Bornholm residents who had been forced to live and 
deal with  these soldiers for so long.  
The Cold War era began in Denmark against a backdrop of humiliation from the German 
machine in the south and unease towards the Russian bear in the east. Despite the drama that 
transpired over Bornholm, Danish-Soviet cooperation continued with relatively few issues after 
its resolution. During a meeting between Danish diplomat Nils Svenningsen and Soviet diplomat 
Ilya Chernyshov in the spring of 1946, both envoys expressed a mutual interest in continuing 
 
9 Hornemann 2006, p. 323. 
10 Hornemann 2006, p. 336-337. 
11 Ibid. 
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open conversations about issues concerning both countries.12 Some of the issues that were 
brought up in this early meeting – interest in Nordic cooperation, Danish prioritization of the 
UN, Danish militarization – were topics of discussion throughout the Cold War, if not beyond. 
Danish-Soviet interactions from the 1950s through the 1970s were marked by a variety of 
differing tones, but an odd insecurity from the side of the Soviets remained a constant 
throughout. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949, creating NATO, and this would 
quickly and indefinitely become a contentious roadblock in Danish-Soviet relations, as well as 
broader West-Soviet/West-Russia relations. 
When Danish diplomat Alex Mørch met with Marshal Kirill Moskalenko in 1956, he 
noted Moskalenko’s fear of an American-led NATO forcing the European members to commit 
troops to an assault on the USSR; this anxiety that Denmark and other European countries could 
be forced by NATO to act appeared multiple other times throughout documented diplomatic 
interactions during the Cold War.13 There was always the possibility of a crazy adventurer 
coming to power in a country and starting a war no one wanted, or so claimed Moskalenko; 
although this fear can likely be traced to the USSR’s years under Josef Stalin, there is irony in its 
realization again forty years later, when Vladimir Putin first came to power in Russia. The 
conversation was characterized by mistrust and suspicion of NATO and Western intentions from 
Moskalenko, which led Mørch to conclude his letter with the remark that it was depressing how 
misinformed such a highly ranked person had to be in order to believe that the Western countries 
were seriously considering an assault on the Soviet Union.14  
 
12 Svenningsen 1946. 
13 Sinnbeck 1958; Hansen 1959; Adamsen 1960. 
14 Mørch 1956. 
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However, Denmark’s close cooperation with NATO countries and with West Germany in 
particular was concerning to the Soviets, although they did not appear to perceive Denmark as an 
important actor in its own right. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev was interviewed by Danish 
Democracy, a newspaper for members of the conservative political party Venstre’s youth 
chapter, in 1958; in his responses, Khrushchev never spoke of Denmark on its own, but only ever 
as part of bilateral relations or in a group of other countries, such as NATO or the Scandinavian 
countries. In the interview, he doubled down on the earlier strategy of warning Denmark against 
the alliances it was choosing – he warned against the creation of a Baltic naval command (which 
was eventually created anyway in 1962), missile armament in the Nordics (which was not taking 
place), and the militarization of the Baltic region (which was, according to him, being done 
against the will of the “peaceful” Scandinavian countries). In his summary of the interview, the 
writer for the newspaper emphasized that the interview had not been conducted out of any 
support for Khrushchev; that Khrushchev’s perception of the Scandinavian countries as peaceful 
was mistaken; and that Soviet threats would not force any of the Nordic countries to “crawl into 
a mousehole”.15 
In October 1956, a student protest began in Budapest, Hungary, against the Soviet-
backed Hungarian People’s Republic. The protest quickly gained traction and turned into a full 
revolution that saw huge popular mobilization across the country, mobilization which seemed to 
successfully turn the political tides in the country. In November, the Soviet government sent a 
large military force to invade the country. Hungarian resistance was able to withstand a week of 
brutal fighting before it was finally put down by the Red Army. In Denmark, this event was 
regarded with horror and shock. At a meeting in March 1957, a secretary at the Soviet embassy 
 
15 Sinnbeck 1958. 
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to Denmark expressed to Danish diplomat Hans Møller his wish for Danish-Soviet relationships 
to become again as good as they had been before the Hungarian Revolution; Møller replied 
honestly that, for him, it had been a “very painful and sorrowful experience to see what had 
happened in Hungary, and it had made a deep impression on [him] and in fact seriously damaged 
[his] otherwise friendly feelings towards the Soviet Union.”16  
Likewise, the editor of Khrushchev’s interview with Danish Democracy in 1958 made a 
point of bringing up the invasion, which he described as a “murderous assault” intended to 
“preserve the [Russian] empire” and which Khrushchev would undoubtedly dismiss as “internal 
affairs”.17 Danes were clearly very shaken by this evidence that the Soviet Union was willing to 
violently interfere within the borders of other countries, if it believed those countries to be 
hosting anti-Soviet behaviors or ideas. The Russian willingness to violate small countries and the 
open Danish disgust at such actions will make significant reappearances at later points in their 
bilateral relationship. 
The following year, when Hungarian Revolution leader Imre Nagy was executed by the 
Soviets for his role in the revolution, Danes protested outside of the Soviet embassy in 
Copenhagen. The Soviet government organized a revenge protest outside the Danish embassy in 
Moscow, in which stones were thrown through the embassy windows and the walls graffitied 
with slogans such as “down with Danish puppets”, “down with the warmongers”, and “shame on 
the Danish NATO-lackeys”. Soviet authorities denied having played any part in the organization 
of the protests (Alex Mørch described the official Soviet response as the type one receives “only 
in dictator countries”), and the official Danish position was that the protest had been organized 
 
16 Møller 1957, p. 2. 
17 Sinnbeck 1958, p. 2. 
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without the knowledge or permission of the Soviet government. In his cable from the Moscow 
embassy back home to Copenhagen, however, Mørch wrote that the Soviet authorities had, 
“without a doubt”, aided the protests. Despite this, he advised that this incident not be interpreted 
as “an expression of particular ill will towards Denmark.”18 
The 1960s opened with more tension between the USSR and Denmark over Denmark’s 
NATO membership. Despite repeated claims by Soviet officials throughout the Cold War period 
that the USSR did not fear Denmark, those same officials often had strong reactions to 
Denmark’s participation in NATO and support of the West during the Cold War. A NATO drill 
called Hold Fast took place around the Danish-West German border in the fall of 1960. Royal 
Danish Defense College students participated alongside regular Danish soldiers in the drill; 
specifically, students who were studying Russian language at the Defense College were chosen 
to act as Soviet prisoners of war. Denmark’s role in Hold Fast, as well as the drill itself, were 
eviscerated in the Soviet press; a September 1960 article in the Soviet military newspaper Red 
Star called the drill “provocative”, claimed that it painted the USSR as aggressors and justified 
support of the “German revanchists”, and pointed to it as proof that alignment with NATO 
“pushes small countries like Denmark down a dangerous road”.19  
A Soviet embassy representative named Rylnikov took this a step further in his 
conversation with the Danish secretary to the prime minister, Helge Hjortdal, and equated 
Operation Hold Fast to cooperation with “a potential enemy”.20 In the same meeting, Rylnikov 
expressed his concern for how the USSR was perceived in Denmark, due to the Danish media’s 
generally unfavorable coverage of the USSR. Hjortdal replied that it was the Danish public’s 
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negative perceptions of the Danish Communist Party (DKP) that were to blame. Relatedly, the 
DKP traveled to Moscow in April 1963 to meet with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU), and was given a warm reception, hosted by a number of high-profile members of the 
Soviet government.  
During the DKP’s “warm and friendly” meeting with two Soviet representatives the next 
day, the DKP shared its preference for a neutral, atomic weapon-free Nordic region, including 
Denmark; in response, the Soviet representatives said that their government was willing to honor 
the territorial integrity of neutral states.21 The unspoken implication of such a statement can be 
taken to mean that the Soviet government would only honor the territorial integrity of neutral 
states; non-neutral, or aligned, states could reasonably expect the opposite. The implicit threat 
here was expanded upon by the Danish ambassador to the Soviet Union, Christian Holten-
Eggert, when he wrote the Danish foreign minister Per Hækkerup a few days later to summarize 
the DKP’s meeting. The Soviet side had mentioned that “Danish-Soviet trade could double, even 
triple, if only Denmark itself wanted it to”, but it was implied that such trade growth was 
contingent upon Denmark leaving NATO in return.22  
Soviet pressure on Denmark to leave NATO intensified in the 1960s and took on a new, 
harsher tone. Hækkerup met with Khrushchev towards the end of 1963, and the Soviet Premier 
insisted on bringing up the past – when then-Danish Prime Minister H.C. Hansen declined to sell 
tankers to the USSR in 1956 – before urging Denmark yet again to leave NATO. Denmark was 
supporting aggressive forces, he said, and the USSR did not fear Denmark. Hækkerup responded 
that it was the Danish position that “the road to détente goes over agreements between NATO 
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and the Warsaw Pact”.23 Khrushchev continued to raise the issue with increasing aggression 
during his meetings in 1964 with Danish Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag. At a meeting of the two 
leaders in February, Khrushchev accused Denmark of following the American policy line and 
discriminating against the USSR, before again bringing up the relationship between Denmark 
and West Germany. “I don’t know what tie connects these two countries; it must be like the rope 
and the hanged man,” he told Krag.24 A few months later, he told Krag that the USSR could be a 
better friend to Denmark than NATO could.25 For such a large country, and one that claimed so 
often it did not fear Denmark, Soviet positions towards the smaller country continued to take on 
an increasingly defensive, insecure, and oddly paranoid tone. There was not much to be feared 
from Denmark by itself, certainly, but the Soviet Union arguably feared the friends Denmark had 
made and the capabilities it could gain from these friendships.  
However, this is not to say that relations between the two countries in the 1960s were 
purely tension-based. Krag was sure to emphasize the goodwill he held towards the Soviet 
people, although this could have been careful word choice to avoid expressing goodwill towards 
the Soviet state. His conversations with Khrushchev also focused heavily on the trade 
relationship between the two countries; Denmark has long prided itself on its agriculture, and its 
agricultural goods and knowledge were highly valued trade commodities in the Soviet Union. 
Another issue that reappeared multiple times in their meetings was the inability of Soviet citizens 
to travel to Denmark to visit family they had there; when Krag brought up the case of a Danish 
man who was married to a Soviet woman and wanted his mother-in-law to be able to come and 
visit from the Soviet Union, Khrushchev replied jokingly, “That can be allowed. It is very 
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seldom that one wishes to be visited by their mother-in-law.”26 The relationship between leaders 
appeared to improve a bit when Khrushchev was removed from power in October 1964 and 
replaced by a troika of leaders; Alexei Kosygin, who replaced Khrushchev as Premier, was well-
regarded by Krag after their initial meetings in October 1965. Despite this, Krag did at one point 
during these meetings feel the need to remind Kosygin that Danish territory is not small; 
Greenland is Danish, and Denmark will use it.27 This will also reoccur as a key strategic part of 
the Danish-Russian relationship further down the road. 
In 1972, there was a minor espionage scandal between the two states when Danish 
intelligence (PET) caught three Soviet embassy employees engaging in espionage activities in 
Denmark. Danish authorities decided against expelling them, for the sake of preserving good 
Danish-Soviet relations; however, they did strongly warn the Soviet Union that action would be 
taken if there were further Soviet spies caught in the future, and action included reconsidering 
the expulsion of the three original spies. They did advise that a voluntary recall was made of the 
three diplomats, stating that this would be taken as a mark of goodwill in their bilateral 
relationship, and the Soviet government complied. However, the Soviet ambassador, much like 
other representatives from his country in decades past, was quite upset about negative Danish 
media coverage of the incident. The Soviet government issued a retaliatory request in the 
summer of 1972 asking for the voluntary recall of two employees at the Danish embassy in 
Moscow, who had allegedly been caught engaging in matters of espionage.28 
In the fall of 1973, the Yom-Kippur War broke out, pitting Israel against Egypt and Syria. 
As a result, numerous Arab countries increased oil prices to the rest of the world, and in some 
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cases decreased their production. The intention was to put pressure on countries that had 
expressed support for Israel. Denmark was hit by this sudden shortage as much as any other 
country and asked its citizens to limit their oil consumption towards the end of October, 
approximately a month after the initial outbreak of war. On November 5th, however, Danish 
Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen gave an impromptu speech in the town of Middelfart. In this 
speech, he said that he could, “for the most part”, understand and justify “Israel’s aggression”.29 
This speech nearly marked Denmark for death, so to speak. Because of this public display of 
support for Israel, Denmark ran the risk of being singled out for a complete oil embargo, as had 
happened to the Netherlands and the United States. According to the Saudi oil minister during a 
private visit to Copenhagen a few weeks later, Denmark had been a mere two votes away from 
suffering this outcome.30  
The oil never fully stopped flowing to Denmark, but the shortages experienced within the 
country and the persistently high prices even after the embargo was lifted were significant 
enough that Denmark began to explore the potential for energy supply cooperation with its 
Scandinavian neighbors Norway and Sweden. Ultimately this crisis (as well as the ramifications 
of the 1979 crisis, when the Iranian Revolution took place) demonstrated to the Danish 
government the importance in guaranteeing supply security, moving from imported to national 
sources of energy, and shifting from a market-driven energy system to one driven by policy and 
planning.31  
Neither Oleg Gordievsky’s name nor his exploits during the Cold War receive as much 
notoriety as those of other historical figures produced by this period. However, as the highest-
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ranking defector from the Soviet Union, his impact upon the outcome of the Cold War should 
not be understated. In 1983, NATO ran a nuclear drill called Able Archer 83. Unfortunately, to 
Soviet eyes this drill looked alarmingly like the real thing, and the call was put out to mobilize 
the Soviet missile systems and prepare to strike the US.32 The Soviet alert stood down after the 
conclusion of the NATO drill; its fearful reaction was never publicly released by the state. The 
West, however, was able to learn of the severity of Soviet paranoia because of Oleg Gordievsky. 
The former KGB colonel was recruited by MI6, the British intelligence service, in the 1970s to 
serve as a double agent against the Soviet Union. Gordievsky was identified as a potential 
defector in the 1960s by the Danish intelligence service, PET, while he was living in 
Copenhagen on a “diplomatic” posting to Denmark during the course of his KGB work. He grew 
disillusioned with the Soviet Union after its brutal repression of the popular uprisings in 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and became a fan of living in Denmark after his initial posting 
there.33 PET picked up on this in its monitoring of the Soviet embassy employees and contacted 
MI6 to see if they would be willing to do the legwork in recruiting him.  
Gordievsky was a valuable double agent for approximately a decade, but his greatest 
contribution was his report back to his handlers about the Soviet reaction to Able Archer 83. The 
role that information plays in both preventing and leading to conflict is difficult to overstate –
wars often break out because one side lacks adequate information about the intentions or abilities 
of the other. The information provided by Gordievsky demonstrated to Western leaders that they 
were dealing with a hair-trigger relationship; as the Chief of MI6 Sir John Scarlett said in 2009, 
“more confidence developed that the other side was understood, and that helped manage the 
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situation and was a key reason why we got to the end [of the conflict] without a blowout”.34 The 
good work of PET and the appeal of Denmark to a disenchanted KGB agent were key reasons 
for securing that confidence. 
The last clash of the Cold War between Denmark and the Soviet Union before the demise 
of the latter took place on a stage that was at once deeply symbolic and slightly unexpected – the 
soccer field. The Danish men’s national team of the 1980s was dubbed “Danish Dynamite” for 
its unprecedented successes on the field and self-deprecating swagger off it. On June 5th, 1985, 
Denmark’s Constitution Day, at Idrætsparken (as the stadium was called at the time) in 
Copenhagen, the Danish Dynamite squad pulled off a huge underdog victory against the Soviet 
Union to qualify for the 1986 World Cup in Mexico. In the days leading up to the match, Danish 
newspapers ran pieces with headlines like “WE WILL SKIN THE RUSSIAN BEAR”.35 
Denmark had met the Soviets on the field eight previous times and lost each one, giving up thirty 
goals along the way.36 This poor record ended in Copenhagen that day – Danish legends Preben 
Elkjær and Michael Laudrup scored two goals each to down the Soviet Union 4-2.  
This is one of the most legendary games played by one of the most legendary squads in 
world soccer history, and the symbolic value on both a sporting and a national level was 
immense. Looking back on the match several decades later, Laudrup (who was only 20 at the 
time of the match) said, “In my many matches with the national team, there have been big 
matches, but the meeting with the Soviet Union 22 years ago remains one of the biggest, because 
everything stood for something bigger than itself…It was like winning a World Cup title, 
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because it was the Soviet Union itself we knocked down”.37 In 2008, he became the manager of 
Spartak Moscow, one of the four Moscow clubs that play in the Russian Premier League, and 
told Danish magazine EkstraBladet in an interview that the Russians have not forgotten the 
match, but that “the Russians are so happy when I tell them that in Denmark, that match is 
counted as one of the three best national team games ever”.38  
Of additional interest is that the in-stadium advertising, while mostly for Danish candy 
brands and Denmark’s beloved draft beer Carlsberg, included Shell Oil and Danfoss, a Danish 
company that produces heating technology and since the 1970s has placed a premium on 
optimizing the efficiency of thermoregulation and radiator products. The advertising of each of 
these companies at one of the most-viewed Danish sporting events ever is significant especially 
given the context of the time period – the oil crises of the 1970s were still fresh memories, and 
the reorganization of the Danish energy sector still underway. 
By the end of the 1980s and the end of the Soviet Union, a clear picture was emerging of 
what Denmark would look like in the years to come. The country went through a little less than a 
century of trauma at the hands of its larger neighbors and emerged from the Second World War 
as a determined member of NATO and contributor to the efforts of the West throughout the Cold 
War. From its experiences with war between 1864 and 1945, Denmark took away the lesson of 
the great risks that can easily befall a small country if it does not take care to build strong 
alliances and situate itself within a greater coalition. Diplomatic relations between Denmark and 
the Soviet Union during the Cold War revealed open and honest, if not always positive, 
interactions between representatives of each country. They also cast light on tensions in the 
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bilateral relationship that would heavily shape the relationship on both sides during the post-Cold 
War period. The energy crises of the 1970s tempered this lesson – overreliance on one country or 
region can just as easily hurt a country as isolation can. The goal of self-sufficiency in Danish 
energy policy from that point forwards will become a key part of the Denmark-Russia story later 
on; however, at the end of the Cold War, Denmark had chosen the surviving side and had taken a 
symbolic victory as well over the Soviet Union on the soccer pitch, and it entered into the post-
Soviet era with confidence in itself and optimism for the new states joining it in Europe. 
Literature Review 
 
 This thesis will make an argument for the significance of the Danish-Russian relationship 
within a broader European context of collective security, energy security, and the overlap 
between the two. Denmark’s shared water border with Russia and its location at the center of 
Northern, Eastern, and Western Europe place it uniquely in a fairly central role to some of the 
largest collective and energy security issues Europe currently faces. However, literature 
documenting and analyzing comprehensively the recent development of the two countries’ 
relationship in the post-Cold War era is lacking. Additionally, Denmark and its role in the 
international system is often undervalued in literature originating outside of Denmark or the 
larger Scandinavian/Nordic region. This paper seeks to contribute to this gap in the literature and 
argue for the relevance of the Danish-Russian relationship to actors outside of Denmark, 
including in Russia itself. The rest of this section will review the major themes that frame this 
argument and the relevant theoretical frameworks that will be used to advance it. 
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Collective security 
 Collective security in Europe following World War II was initially manifested by the 
opposing security blocs on either side of the Iron Curtain – the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), and the Warsaw Pact. The bipolarity of the global threat landscape during 
the Cold War meant that countries fell fairly simply into one of three camps, aligning with either 
the Western liberal order, the Eastern communist one, or neutral non-alignment. The end of the 
Cold War saw the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, comprising the USSR, Albania, Hungary, 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Romania. The expectation of many former 
Warsaw Pact members, especially Russia, was that NATO, too, would dissolve, as there was no 
longer a need for its existence. NATO, however, neither shared nor fulfilled this expectation. 
Consequently, NATO’s role in a post-Cold War, European Union-adjacent security architecture 
has been and still is a hotly debated subject. NATO itself lacks internal consensus about what its 
principal role, primary duties, and future expansion policies should be; this makes more difficult 
the process of securitization, which can be defined as the justified and urgent response of an 
actor to a perceived threat.39  
In the EU context, as well, threat construction varies by member state, and this can hinder 
a securitizing move in response to Russian activities or behavior. However, worth noting is 
Floyd’s argument that collective securitization need not have “unanimous or even majority 
support” in order to be just and morally permissible.40 NATO has also had to reorient itself 
following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. This reorientation meant a return to a regional 
focus upon Europe, as opposed to the organization’s more global strategy in the 2000s of 
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focusing upon its borders.41 The willingness of countries to go to war on behalf of certain other 
countries, whether due to geographic location, the ability of the threatened country to protect 
itself, or other competing interests, is another weakness that Russia continues to highlight 
successfully with its challenging behavior in the Baltic Sea Region, which includes Denmark.42 
 NATO and Russia have always had an inherently flawed relationship. The Warsaw Pact 
dissolved alongside the Soviet Union, but NATO continued to function, and indeed expand, after 
the Cold War ended. The expectations Russia and NATO have had of each other since 1991 have 
never really aligned; they may simply have “fundamentally irreconcilable strategic interests”.43 
The Russian feeling of marginalization by the principal actors determining the post-Cold War 
security order is argued by a number of Western scholars to have been the primary factor in 
Russia’s decision in 2008 to end what George Friedman terms its “long period of irrelevance” by 
invading Georgia.44  
A defining feature of the Cold War was the arms race – one side, in developing new and 
more advanced weaponry, posed a larger threat than before to the other side, which then felt the 
need to augment its own security with its own improved weaponry, and so on. This is an 
example of the concept known as the security dilemma, which states that “many of the means by 
which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others”.45 The liberal 
international order after the Cold War was intended to be one in which countries could freely 
choose their own alignment and their partners. The failure of the West, however, to take Russia 
seriously in the 1990s and better incorporate it into the new structures taking shape helped lay 
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part of the foundation upon which the conflicts of the 2000s and 2010s would be built. Both 
NATO and the EU eagerly pursued this liberal order, expanding quickly eastward to fulfill the 
promise of self-determination that much of Eastern Europe had been denied with the brutal 
Soviet repressions of the second half of the 20th century. Russian concerns over NATO’s 
intentions, suspicious of its claim to be a purely defensive alliance, flared up again with the 
ascension to power of Vladimir Putin, a young new Russian prime minister with a grudge against 
the West.  
NATO’s expansion is arguably an example of a classic security dilemma. NATO 
aspirants hope to gain security with the organization’s expansion; in the case of several Eastern 
European countries, this more specifically means safety from Russia. Russia feels increasingly 
threatened by NATO and takes steps to make itself more secure, whether through conventional 
military armament or illegal acts of aggression taken against its neighbors; the cycle continues. 
As a country on the Baltic, Denmark is rather closer to some of these saber-rattling events than 
the rest of its Western partners in either NATO or the EU, yet further from the action than the 
member states which feel most threatened by Russia, namely Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Poland. Denmark is geographically well-placed to take part in NATO collective security 
initiatives in the region, as well as the integrated EU trade of the Baltic Sea Region. This also 
puts it in a spot to act as a bridge for both security and economic concerns of Eastern and 
Western members of both treaties. 
Trade and conflict 
With regards to Denmark and Russia, there are key questions surrounding the effect that 
their very limited trade relationship may or may not have upon the quality and standing of their 
overall relationship. The consensus of much of the literature on the ties between trade and 
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conflict is that trade most often has a tempering effect upon dynamics of conflict between 
countries; generally, the more bound up in trade a country is with another, whether directly as 
partners or indirectly through mutual partners, the costlier it will be for the countries to break 
those ties and go to war. Hegre attempts to find an empirical solution to the question of whether 
“trade may increase the risks of conflict if a powerful partner in an asymmetrical relationship 
employs the weaker partner’s dependence to obtain political concessions”.46 He ultimately finds, 
however, that while trade in a symmetric dyad decreases the propensity for conflict, there is no 
empirical evidence indicating that an asymmetric dyad is at greater risk of entering into conflict.  
Similarly, Kinne finds that asymmetric trade is strongly correlated with centrality 
(defined by Kinne as a measure of trade integration based on the breadth and strength of a state’s 
trade ties); the more asymmetric trade relationships a state is a part of, the greater the constraints 
upon it and the less likely it is to pursue conflictual behavior.47 In the case of Russia, however, it 
is the main trade partner of countries in what it considers to be the Russian sphere of influence 
(primarily the former Soviet Union). Due to the obvious size discrepancies between Russia and 
its small neighboring countries, there is a significant degree of asymmetry inherent to these trade 
relationships that does not prevent Russia from provoking conflict with these countries. Kinne’s 
finding appears therefore to apply to the smaller partner in an asymmetric trade relationship.  
As will be explored later in this paper, Denmark used its trade ties to Russia in 2009 to 
salvage what had been a broken, negative relationship for the better part of the decade, when it 
accepted Russia’s bid to route the Nord Stream gas pipeline from northwestern Russia to 
northern Germany through Danish waters. This highly significant deepening of otherwise 
 
46 Hegre 2004, p. 404. 
47 Kinne 2012. 
28 
 
 
 
negligible trade ties between the two countries did decrease the likelihood of conflict in their 
relationship in the short term, but had larger implications in the area of energy security. 
Energy 
 Energy security is a highly ambiguous concept, the focus and emphasis of which change 
easily according to the intent with which the concept is being deployed. I will be primarily using 
Kalicki and Goldwin’s definition of energy security, “the assurance of the ability to access the 
energy resources required for the continued development of national power,” with the qualifier 
that the assurance of ability for access comes free of political influence by external actors.48 
Europe’s growing dependency upon Russian energy supplies is widely considered to be a threat 
to European security and political sovereignty. Russia has made no secret of its willingness to 
shut off the gas flow to some of its energy partners in Eastern Europe over the last fifteen years 
or so alone, but there is disagreement over whether Russia would take these same steps against 
Western European partners, were it to increase its leverage over them through increasing gas 
deliveries.  
Although Russia is also a major exporter of oil, the methods of transporting gas (pipeline) 
versus oil (barrels) make the gas market easier for creating asymmetries of structure, and thus of 
power.49 Nygård finds that Russia has both the will and the way to wield gas as an instrument of 
foreign policy against Western Europe, as it does in Eastern Europe. Despite this, because Russia 
depends on the income from higher gas prices in Western Europe, it is unlikely to shut off the 
gas to the West. However, the EU’s gas production is falling, and consequently it will need to 
import more gas over the coming decades, as renewable energy sources are not yet ready to play 
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a competitive role for much of Europe. Echoing Nygård, Paillard argues that “Russia has the 
means and the political will to create new routes and to make countries favorably disposed to its 
economic and political interests, regardless of European policy,” while also recognizing that 
Russia and Europe will need each other to stay above water for the next few decades at least.50  
Paillard recommends that reorganization of European gas industries and development of 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) capabilities take place to diversify European supply security and to 
counteract the Russian strategic aim of driving a wedge between Europe and the US, a major 
LNG exporter. Indeed, energy transit is the major determinant of the degree to which energy 
exports can be used as tools of foreign policy and influence by the exporter. For most of Europe, 
receiving LNG entails the building of new infrastructure and/or upgrading of existing 
infrastructure; the prohibitive costs associated mean that LNG has yet to become a truly 
competitive option in Europe.51  
Additionally, the greatly varying and inconsistent gas risk exposure across EU member 
states means that a one-size-fits-all EU energy security policy would be extremely difficult to 
achieve.52 There are competing northern and southern strategies within the European energy 
market, and energy security means something different for West and East-Central Europe 
respectively.53 This paper situates Denmark in the uncertain spot of bridging both Western and 
Eastern-Central European energy needs, and argues that using this perception of Denmark’s 
positioning in European energy security architecture can help to explain inconsistent Danish 
policies implemented in the past thirty years. Additionally, Denmark’s heavy investment into its 
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own renewable energy sector since the 1970s confirms Rickli’s conclusion that investment by 
small states into clean technology makes them more energy secure by reducing their 
vulnerability to outside pressures.54 
Danish Policy 
 The most important theoretical concepts to understand before studying Danish foreign 
policy revolve around the formation of the small state mentality and its operationalization in both 
political and public discourses. Due to Denmark’s relatively recent historical experiences with 
larger neighbors, explained in the earlier history section of this paper, Danish politics after the 
end of the Cold War continue to use the framework of these historical lessons and to apply them 
to experiences of the Cold War. Mouritzen and Runge Olesen categorize possible types of 
historical lessons as internalized or instrumental, and develop a luxury theory to explain the 
impact a state’s freedom of action has upon the deployment of past geopolitics in contemporary 
political decisions.55 This idea was expanded upon in a later argument that the assertive Danish 
attitude towards Russia of the 2000s could be attributed largely to Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the 
Danish prime minister from 2001 to 2009, and his personal internalization of his country’s past 
geopolitics.56 To this end, Farbøl identifies three types of narratives prevalent in Danish 
discourse (conflict, consensus, and protest narratives), using historicizations of Danish Cold War 
history, and explains their application by various Danish political figures, including Fogh 
Rasmussen, during major foreign policy events post-Cold War.57  
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This historicization of Danish Cold War history was also found to have influenced and be 
further influenced by Denmark’s shift from active internationalism to international activism, 
which was in part catalyzed by Denmark’s larger allies (namely the US).58 Active 
internationalism refers to an activist, multilateral tradition of Danish foreign policy from the 
1980s through 2001, which sought primarily to preserve a balanced order in Denmark’s 
neighborhood.59 International activism refers to the post-2001 shift in Danish foreign policy, 
which instead prioritized bilateral relations and greater self-assertion.60 These narrative 
frameworks in turn shaped Danish perceptions of Russian leaders and actions in the same time 
period, leading to overwhelmingly negative media coverage in Denmark of Russia during the 
2000s and 2010s.61 Outside of discourse, Denmark’s strong support of NATO and skepticism 
towards the EU, already covered in the earlier section on collective security, came from these 
utilizations of past geopolitics; similarly, Denmark’s active role in developing its neighbors in 
the Baltic Sea Region does as well. Building up the Baltic countries helps Denmark provide a 
buffer zone between itself and a potentially aggressive Russia. Such aid also wins it friends in 
regional fora intended to deal with Baltic Sea Region issues. 
Military Relations 
 
 The Berlin Wall, separating East Germany from West Germany, and the communist 
Eastern bloc from the capitalist Western one, came down in the fall of 1989; Lars Løkke 
Rasmussen, who would become the prime minister of Denmark twenty years later, was there 
with his wife when it did. It marked the real emergence of a new Europe that had already started 
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to take shape with the popular uprisings against communism in the preceding decades, and that 
would crystallize two years later with the breakup of the Soviet Union. One of fifteen former 
Soviet republics, the new Russian state thought that the new order in Europe was up for debate. 
Those in the West, primarily those aligned with NATO, did not.  
Denmark had placed itself firmly in the NATO camp forty years earlier. The prime 
minister in 1989, Poul Schlüter (Conservative/Konservative, K), told Danes in his New Year’s 
Eve address of that year, “The cohesion in the western, democratic world’s defense alliance has 
been one of the essential prerequisites for the world now looking lighter than it was a few years 
ago.”62 The following year, in his speech at the opening of the 1990-91 session of the parliament, 
he called upon his country to make its influence in the world count – small countries needed to 
take responsibility for the direction of the world and of Europe.63 NATO was, for Denmark, the 
primary frame that would allow it to do so. 
 Denmark had learned during and leading up to World War II that it did not stand much 
of a fighting chance without a reliable alliance of friends around it, and during the Cold War it 
sought to cement its place in NATO as a valued and contributive member. Now, entering the 
1990s and exiting the bipolarity of the Cold War threat landscape, it was unclear what NATO’s 
existential purpose was now. Despite this ambiguity, Danish leadership continued to throw its 
support behind NATO throughout the 1990s. It was suggested in the early 1990s that Danish 
soldiers should be deployed to the former Soviet Union and provide assistance;64 this was 
perhaps in light of the vicious civil war that had broken out in Yugoslavia, and of the Russian 
troops lingering in the Baltic countries even after they had achieved independence from the 
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Soviet Union. Schlüter’s conservative government was replaced by Poul Nyrup Rasmussen’s 
left-leaning one in January 1993, but the rhetoric at the highest level didn’t change.  
Throughout the mid-90s, Nyrup Rasmussen (Social Democrats/Socialdemokratiet, S) 
continued to utilize the same rhetoric placing NATO at the center of the security architecture for 
Denmark and for Europe, as well as advocating for NATO’s expansion eastward. At the 
parliamentary level, there was less unity about the wisdom of further expansion of the military 
alliance. In January 1994, Nyrup Rasmussen’s minister of defense, Hans Hækkerup (S), 
allegedly threatened a new Cold War with Russia; the rapid responses by Nyrup Rasmussen and 
his foreign minister Niels Helveg Petersen (Danish Social Liberal Party/Radikale Venstre, RV) 
in denial of the threat are clear, even if the content of the supposed threat itself is not.65 Over the 
next few years, members of parliament (MPs) belonging to both sides of the political spectrum 
questioned the effect of NATO expansion upon Russia’s respective relationships with Denmark, 
Europe, and the West.  
The Danish leadership continued to express support for the alliance’s expansion in the 
face of rejection of this idea by the Russian leadership. In the aftermath of the Cold War, 
nominally no state was supposed to hold sway over how another state chose to align or which 
friends it chose to make; this does not, however, change the fact that Russia was signaling its 
discomfort with a close proximity to NATO, and these signals were ignored or not properly 
addressed. Danish experts argued at the time that NATO expansion risked stalling the 
demilitarization of the Baltic Sea region and of the Russian Kaliningrad region (bordering 
Poland and Lithuania), and in doing so risk isolating Russia and excluding it from European 
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security structures.66 NATO expansion further ran the risk of pushing Russia to withdraw from 
the START agreement, which both reduced and limited strategic offensive weapons. For the 
West, this would represent a lost opportunity to gain influence over Russian nuclear policy.  
In 1992, the small southern Russian region of Chechnya formally broke away from the 
Russian Federation and became the independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Because of its 
significant strategic and symbolic importance to the Russian leadership, then-Russian president 
Boris Yeltsin pushed back on the secession by supporting opposition forces in the small-scale 
civil war that broke out in Chechnya. The Russian military invaded in December 1994, 
apparently to restore order. This was the start of the First Chechen War, which lasted just under 
two years, and killed an estimated 18,500 to 80,000 Chechen civilians and 4,000 Russian 
soldiers, up to half of whom are believed to have been killed in just the first few days of 
fighting.67  
The effects of the Russian forces’ brutality upon Russia’s and Yeltsin’s reputations 
among the international community and other Russian republics were strongly negative. In 
Denmark, support lay behind a political solution to the conflict. Shortly before the Russian 
military cut its losses and withdrew from Chechnya in August 1996, Danish MP Holger K. 
Nielsen (S) called upon his government to take responsibility and pressure the Russian 
government, adding, “It’s embarrassing that the West has not placed greater pressure on the 
Russian government around the conflict in Chechnya. The conflict will be resolved not through 
Russian chauvinism and massive bombardments, but through political negotiations alone.”68 The 
actions of the Russian military were concerning in the West and did little to ease Western doubts 
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about whether the new Russian state was truly on the path towards democracy. Military 
intervention was never considered an option in Denmark, though, despite disgust over the reports 
of high casualties and brutality coming out of Chechnya. Peace temporarily came to Chechnya 
soon after, with the signing of the Khasavyourt peace accord on August 31, 1996.  
The Danish Defense Ministry periodically tasks a Defense Commission 
(Forsvarskommissionen) with investigating and identifying potential threats or challenges that 
the country may be facing in the years to come, and then publishing a report summarizing the 
challenges and recommendations for the next defense mandate. The 1997 Defense Commission’s 
report, which was titled The defense of the future and released in 1998, established the concept of 
indirect security as a key one to the defense of Denmark’s interests going forward. Some of the 
core ideas behind this concept had already entered into practice in Danish foreign and economic 
policy earlier in the decade; this will be covered in later chapters. “Indirect security is, in its 
current scope, of qualitatively new meaning for Denmark. Denmark has engaged itself in a 
number of military assignments – most clearly in the former Yugoslavia – that in no way appear 
to pose a direct threat for Denmark. This is primarily because Denmark has a fundamental 
interest in the stability of the order which was established after the end of the Cold War, in that it 
gives a – historically speaking – exceptionally high degree of security,” the report reads.69  
This concept helped bring Denmark’s military into contact with Russian forces during the 
1990s, as the report cited – Danish troops joined the UN peacekeeping efforts in the former 
Yugoslavia (primarily Croatia and Bosnia, at first) from 1993 to 2003. The political and military 
turmoil at home prevented Russia as a state actor from taking too active a role in the first wave 
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of the Yugoslav Wars (1991-95), but a large number of Russian volunteers and mercenaries took 
part in the fighting on the ground during this time. Russia had, however, opposed a NATO 
bombing campaign in the Balkans at this time, mostly because it viewed such a NATO 
engagement in the heart of Europe a concerning precedent to set before Russia and the United 
States had had the opportunity to reconcile and clarify their new strategic relationship.70  
Only a few years passed before war broke out again in the former Yugoslavia, this time 
in Kosovo in the summer of 1998 when Serbian government forces clashed with Kosovan 
students. Kosovo sought independence from Serbia; Serbia sought to hold on to Kosovo, for 
historically symbolic reasons. NATO established a Kosovo Force (KFOR) in June 1999, and less 
than a week later the Danish parliament resolved to deploy Danish soldiers in support of 
KFOR.71 In February of that year, Danish MPs belonging to the Socialist People’s Party 
(Socialistisk Folkeparti, SF) had asked that Nyrup Rasmussen’s government, among other things, 
ensure that future out-of-area operations by NATO only take place if the UNSC had issued a 
mandate.72 Nyrup Rasmussen chose to remain in line with his active foreign policy. A month 
later, NATO began its three-month bombing campaign against Yugoslavia. These three months 
were NATO’s first offensive war, contrasting with its perennially stated purpose of being a 
purely defensive alliance, and they took place without a true legal justification by the UN 
Security Council.  
This was because of Russia – on the same grounds that Russia had opposed NATO action 
in the mid-90s, it was again arguing that “the aggressive military action unleashed by the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against a sovereign State was a real threat to international 
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peace and security, and grossly violated the key provisions of the United Nations Charter”.73 
Kosovo, as would be demonstrated several times over in years to come, also has a special 
significance for Russia; its relationship to Serbia can represent a sort of analog to what Chechnya 
is to Russia. A successful intervention by foreign powers on behalf of Kosovo, and subsequent 
independence, set a potentially dangerous precedent for future developments in the Chechen bid 
for independence. The NATO intervention in Kosovo was a watershed moment in post-Cold War 
Europe and in the formation of West-Russia relations, and Denmark was a participant, despite 
lacking political consensus at home about the intervention. 
While these incompatible expectations were playing out at a very international level, 
Denmark was also facing post-war military reorientation at home, in the Baltic Sea region. 
Perhaps naturally, due to the region being Denmark’s home neighborhood, history played a 
larger role in military matters here than elsewhere. Peter Skaarup, an MP belonging to the 
Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF), asked foreign minister Niels Helveg Petersen in 
April 1998 about an alleged long-standing agreement with Russia that no foreign troops be 
allowed on the island of Bornholm, made after the Soviet Union agreed to leave the island again 
in 1946. Helveg Petersen denied that such an agreement had ever existed and added, “The end of 
the Cold War has fundamentally changed the security policy relationships in the Baltic Sea 
region. Changing Danish governments have continually emphasized a contribution to détente in 
that part of Europe. This has over time come to express itself in different ways, including 
through limitations on military activity in concrete situations.”74  
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However, Skaarup appears to either have been truly convinced of this agreement’s 
existence, or truly determined to stir up trouble in the parliament; either way, he asked the same 
question to Helveg Petersen three additional times over the following year.75 It is not fully clear 
from the questions what the source of Skaarup’s concern was, but his insistence on the 
agreement’s existence (based upon a claim by Russian ambassador Alexander Chepurin) 
seemingly indicates at the very least a general anxiety that Russia could still be wielding 
influence over Danish military alignment and geostrategic interests. 
At the same time, certain quarters of Danish politics were voicing their opposition to 
NATO expansion to the east, specifically to the Baltic countries. They feared consequences 
ranging from the halting of Russia’s nuclear disarmament to the spread of nationalism within 
Russia itself.76 Nyrup Rasmussen did not share their concerns. He continued throughout the late 
1990s to advocate for EU and NATO expansion to Central and Eastern Europe, particularly to 
the three Baltic countries Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Regarding NATO expansion, he said 
that its door to new members must continue to be held open;77 regarding EU expansion, he went 
as far as to assert that the EU, rather than NATO, was “the only way” to peace and security in 
Europe, so that it could anchor the new democracies forming in Eastern and Central Europe.78  
Poland became a NATO member in March 1999, and the Baltic countries joined five 
years later in March 2004, becoming the first (and remain, as of May 2020, the only) former 
Soviet states to join the organization. Denmark’s strategic plan for the Baltic Sea Region at the 
close of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s, therefore, was to aid in the military linkage of the 
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Baltic countries to NATO, prior to their actual accession to the treaty. From 1962 to 2002, 
NATO’s multinational Baltic command (BALTAP) was based out of Karup, in central Jylland 
(the Danish peninsula). Hans Hækkerup, the defense minister who had previously suggested a 
new cold war with Russia, suggested now that this command be used to help implement the 
Partnership for Peace (PFP) program.  
PFP is intended to be a trust-building measure between NATO members and non-
members in the rest of Europe, including both those who do and do not aspire to eventual NATO 
membership. Poland and the Baltic countries were all PFP members prior to their NATO 
accession; Russia itself is a member and has been since June 1994.79 However, fears in some 
sectors over creating too polarizing a security climate in the Baltic Sea region found controversy 
here as well. Keld Albrechtsen, an MP who represented the far-left socialist party Unity List 
(Enhedslisten, EL), was responsible for voicing some of the warier viewpoints towards the new 
post-Cold War order throughout the 1990s. Albrechtsen accused Hækkerup of trying to backdoor 
Sweden and Finland into NATO while also moving NATO closer to Russian borders, all under 
the pretext of peacekeeping exercises and operations in the Baltic Sea region.80 Albrechtsen 
feared that Denmark’s posturing in the region, and its role in linking the Baltic countries even 
further to NATO, would be interpreted as “aggressive and Russia-hostile”.81  
BALTAP was phased out in the early 2000s, and was for all intents and purposes 
succeeded by the Multinational Corps Northeast, set up as a joint German-Danish-Polish 
command in 1999 at Szczecin in northwestern Poland. Albrechtsen, joined by his Unity List 
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colleague Søren Søndergaard, later called the establishment of this corps, as well as the PFP 
program, “poison for a general détente in all of Europe, and [they] are seen by Russia as a 
military encirclement of Russia”.82 Nyrup Rasmussen continued to speak on the importance of 
increased Danish presence at the international level, and also contributed significant Danish 
support towards the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, the OSCE. 
In the spring of 1999, Copenhagen hosted the Conference on Regional Cooperation in an 
Enlarged Europe. At the opening of the conference, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen took the opportunity 
to mention the experiences of the Nordic and Baltic countries in having learned to live with big 
neighbors; this, he said, was a convincing argument in favor of regional cooperation.83 Russia 
was clearly one of these big neighbors, for both of these regions. Regional security was 
becoming a topic of increasing significance to Danish leadership at the close of the 1990s; in 
terms of ongoing conflicts, Russia was also considered by Denmark to be an important force in 
ensuring regional peace in Kosovo, still playing out at the time. In this same speech, Nyrup 
Rasmussen stressed the Danish commitment to deploying soft security – preventive diplomacy 
and long-term cooperation – alongside the military focus of hard security, which he found to be a 
reductive view of security as a concept. He also cited the EU as the “key player” in European 
security.  
However, when the Treaty on the European Union was ratified seven years earlier in 
Maastricht, referendum results in Denmark only allowed the country to ratify the treaty and thus 
its EU membership with four reservations, or opt-outs. One of these was the defense opt-out, 
meaning Denmark cannot participate in common EU defense efforts. In May of 1999, Nyrup 
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Rasmussen defended this reservation as a Danish rejection of the construction of a common 
European defense in competition with NATO and outside of NATO.84 The OSCE and UN were 
also named essential security actors. Regardless of what Nyrup Rasmussen’s true feelings were 
about what role the EU should play in European security, the defense opt-out rendered any of 
that irrelevant. Denmark now had to put all its stock into the other available actors. With the 
Russian bombing of Chechnya in August 1999 and re-invasion in October, this most 
immediately became the OSCE. 
In the intervening years between the end of the First Chechen War in 1996 and the 
beginning of the Second Chechen War in 1999, power vacuum conditions in Chechnya gave rise 
to armed struggles between competing warlords. Violence and crime proliferated in the small 
republic and spilled over into neighboring Dagestan with the month-long Dagestan War in 
August 1999. Vladimir Putin, at the time virtually unknown across the country, was named 
President Yeltsin’s prime minister and eventual successor as president almost immediately prior 
to the outbreak of this war. Then, over a two-week period in September, Russia “was hit by a 
series of bomb attacks that blew apart mostly suburban apartment blocks, claiming the lives of 
305 and injuring over 1,000 in Moscow and the provincial cities of Volgodonsk and 
Buynaksk”.85 The Russian government blamed the attacks on Chechen terrorists; however, a 
number of eyewitness accounts and journalists connected the attacks to the FSB, Russia’s 
security service.86  
There are two primary lines of reasoning for the outbreak of the Second Chechen War, 
the events of which gave Putin high visibility and allowed him to prove his strength to the 
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country. The first is the official Russian version of events, which argues that federal troops were 
fighting to restore constitutional order in the North Caucasus and prevent a spiral of violence 
from reaching other republics of the Russian Federation. The second is that Chechnya became a 
scapegoat and foundational brick in the rise to power of an unpopular new prime minister. Either 
way, the new war was a brutal one from the outset – the Chechen capital Grozny was seized and 
essentially leveled by February 2000. The international community was quick to condemn Boris 
Yeltsin and his military. 
The OSCE held a summit in Istanbul in November 1999. Helle Degn, a Danish social 
democrat who had served as the Vice President of the Organization from 1994-98 and was now 
serving as the president of the OSCE’s Parliamentary Assembly, gave an address in which she 
identified the conflicts in Chechnya and in Nagorno-Karabakh (a disputed territory between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan) as proof of the fragility of peace in Europe.87 This detail is of note 
because it reflects a larger Danish acceptance of the North and South Caucasus regions, the latter 
of which also includes Georgia, as part of Europe. This acceptance is not shared throughout all of 
Western Europe or by Russia, and the debate has significant implications upon the areas of 
operation for NATO, the EU, and the OSCE itself. In his own address to the summit, Nyrup 
Rasmussen stated, “Russia is an invaluable partner in European security. We reaffirm our 
position on the territorial integrity of Russia. And there should be no doubt about our attitude to 
terrorism. But we also call on Russia to redress the tragic situation in Chechnya without 
delay…What we see and hear about the military activity, is completely out of proportions.”88 He 
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was one of a number of other Western leaders to openly criticize the actions of Russian troops in 
Chechnya at the summit.  
Yeltsin responded forcefully. “You have no right to criticize Russia over Chechnya,” he 
argued. “I am convinced that stability and security in Europe cannot be considered without 
taking Russia into account…We all already know to what disproportionate consequences 
[humanitarian] intervention can lead – suffice to recall USA-led NATO aggression against 
Yugoslavia.”89 He accused the other members of the OSCE of “mutual recriminations and 
moralizing”, and then stormed out of the summit early. Russia saw Chechnya as its right to self-
assertion as a security actor. The statements made by Danish representatives at this time 
reiterated the value they saw in Russia as a security actor, but Chechnya was viewed as a security 
threat and a red flag for Russian participation in the European security order. 
Between Chechnya and 9/11, the military component of Denmark’s relationship with 
Russia also concerned a large part of the Danish kingdom itself – Greenland. Although 
autonomous and practicing limited self-government, Greenland has indeed been a part of the 
Danish kingdom since the early nineteenth century. Its large size and proximity to the Arctic 
have given it high strategic significance to Denmark and in turn granted greater strategic 
importance to Denmark in the eyes of larger powers. Since World War II, Greenland has been 
home to a sizeable American military presence, following an agreement by a rogue Danish 
diplomat with the US government.90 Today, the US Air Force’s Thule base in northern 
Greenland is the main military fixture on the island.  
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In the 1990s, this translated to concerns that Denmark and Greenland, especially the 
Greenlandic people, would be dragged into a US-Russia arms race. The advanced radar 
capabilities at Thule meant that if the US decided to build out its arsenal of nuclear weapons to 
eliminate the Russian missile threat, Greenland would immediately gain immense military 
strategic value. Keld Albrechtsen argued in parliament that Greenland risked becoming a hostage 
in a conflict between NATO and the US on one side and Russia on the other, without any regard 
to the actual wishes of either Greenland’s elected politicians or population.91 This mirrored 
Danish and Greenland concerns twenty years later, when Donald Trump tried to buy Greenland 
from Denmark without any consideration for, among many other things, the population of 56,000 
living in the territory. 
The Danish-American friendship and military cooperation in Greenland often led to more 
concerns in Denmark than were caused by Russian activities in the region. In the fall of 1999, the 
US was considering upgrading its missile defense, which included modernizing the Thule base – 
such upgrades would violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, to which the US was a 
signatory. Violating the treaty provoked a sharp response from Russia. Holger K. Nielsen told 
foreign minister Niels Helveg Petersen that the American recognition of its treaty violation “was 
in itself deeply problematic, but it will put the Danish government under pressure.”92 Helveg 
Petersen clarified that the US and Russia had agreed to make an exception or adaption to the 
treaty. Nielsen was also, however, concerned over the “growing tendency [in the US] towards 
apathy about international agreements, a tendency to want to do things themselves”.93 
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Albrechtsen also continued to be critical of his government’s partisan role in international 
conflicts. “We live in an illusion if we here in the West imagine that Western great powers can 
have a monopoly on interpreting international law, but, say, China and Russia cannot,” he 
argued. “If NATO and the EU, in the years to come, reserve for themselves the right to decide 
when and where there must be military interventions, then it has been opened up for other 
countries to do the same.”94  
One of the many things altered by September 11, 2001, was the short-term relationship 
between Russia and the West. Putin was very quick in reaching out to Bush to express his 
sympathy and offer Russia’s concrete support to the US in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, 
building on support he had already been offering to the West in fighting terrorism since his 
ascension to power.95 Poul Nyrup Rasmussen was also supportive of the US, of working with 
Russia against terrorism, and of the idea that 9/11 could bring together old enemies.96 The war in 
Chechnya was still ongoing – this was precisely why Putin was so committed to establishing 
terrorism as a common cause against which the US and Europe, including Russia, could unite. 
Chechen terrorism – or, according to critics of the Russian government, allegedly Chechen 
terrorism – was still being used to justify the war in Chechnya. Putin hoped to swap out the 
West’s criticism of Russian actions in Chechnya for sympathy and support, by successfully 
demonstrating that Chechen Islamic terrorism plagued Russia just as much as Middle Eastern 
Islamic terrorism plagued the US.  
This succeeded to a limited extent in Denmark, causing a paradoxical situation wherein 
the Danish parliament and government continued to condemn Russian human rights abuses in 
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Chechnya, yet in the case of the government refused to raise the issue through formal channels. 
The new foreign minister in Denmark, Per Stig Møller, responded to criticism by Danish MPs 
for not doing so by saying that, although Russian behavior was upsetting, the government would 
not raise the issue because the situation with Russia changed after 9/11; this response was met 
with renewed criticism.97 Somewhat comically, the criticism raised in the Danish parliament by 
Albrechtsen and Søndergaard referred to the fact that Stig Møller had himself been a part of a 
group of MPs that wrote to his own predecessor as foreign minister, demanding that Denmark 
bring charges against Russia in the European Court of Human Rights for what was going on in 
Chechnya. The intersection of Danish military interests and values-driven Danish foreign policy 
in the 2000s over the War on Terror revealed a prioritization of the former over the latter.  
The NATO mission in the War on Terror was to defend the borders of the alliance. This 
was a mission to which the new Danish prime minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen (Left/Venstre, 
V), heartily cosigned following his election in November 2001. Fogh Rasmussen is famously – 
or infamously – a critic of Russia, to put it lightly, and eventually left his post as prime minister 
to serve as General Secretary of NATO, from 2009 to 2014. He was friends with George W. 
Bush and shared with him a similar outlook; he is a member of the deceptively-named Left party, 
which is actually conservative liberal. While he was an active supporter of the War on Terror and 
on military cooperation with Russia in this endeavor, as well as closer NATO cooperation with 
Russia, he also actively pursued interests that Russia had pushed against for years. Fogh 
Rasmussen was, and still is today, a passionate advocate for NATO expansion, particularly to 
countries in Russia’s neighborhood. He also advocated for a continued US military presence in 
Europe. At the November 2002 NATO summit in Prague, seven states were invited to begin 
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accession talks: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. With the 
exception of Slovenia, all these countries were part of the Warsaw Pact; three of them were 
former Soviet republics. At the same summit, Finland, Sweden, Ukraine, and Georgia were 
reaffirmed as non-member contributors to NATO.  
Fogh Rasmussen spoke at the summit and, in commenting on the historic NATO 
membership of former Soviet republics, said, “Let me stress: Our enlargement is not directed 
against Russia. It is an effort to heal and integrate Europe. We all have an interest in this process. 
Russia will also benefit.”98 The following day, he spoke to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
(EAPC). Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze also gave an address, in which he argued that 
Georgia’s future as an independent nation hinged upon continued NATO’s eastward expansion; 
the membership invitations to Romania and Bulgaria, therefore, were welcome developments, as 
they expanded Black Sea representation in NATO’s area of operations.99 These were ideas with 
which Fogh Rasmussen agreed. He continued to present NATO’s eastward expansion as a matter 
of getting the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe “safely inside our Western 
cooperation organizations”.100 This clearly implies safety from something; the context indicates 
that it is Russia from which these new democracies must seek protection.  
 Fogh Rasmussen explained his commitment to multilateralism as “the simple reason 
that, as individual nations, we are in no position to stand alone in matters of international 
security”.101 He also continually invoked Denmark’s 1864 military defeat to Germany. History 
remained an important tool for him. As late as 2008, the Danish military was reportedly still 
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using anti-Russian/Soviet/communist names and scenarios for basic training scenarios, examples 
of which include: “Red alliance has entered Danish territory”; “Russia, Poland and other allies 
have united against Denmark because the Slavic minorities residing in Denmark have been 
discriminated against”; and “Russia, Poland and other allies have invaded parts of South 
Sjælland and Lolland-Falster”.102 It should be noted that Denmark has never been home to a 
sizeable Slavic minority population – in the first quarter of 2020, less than 2% of the overall 
population originated from a Slavic country.103  
The lens through which Fogh Rasmussen viewed the role Denmark should be playing 
internationally was scarred by Denmark’s past experiences with its neighbors; in the mid-2000s, 
neighborhood policy became an important component of his security policy. From the mid-2000s 
until the end of his tenure as prime minister, Fogh Rasmussen also began to heavily link energy 
security to national and European security; this will be analyzed in a later chapter. He continued 
to hold, however, that securitizing moves being made in Europe by NATO, whether expansion of 
membership or expansion of missile defenses, were not threats to Russia.  
Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia was not met with a military response by Western 
Europe, but Fogh Rasmussen’s rhetoric towards Russia changed markedly after the fact. He also 
pointed to the war as a case for why the EU needed to strengthen its foreign and security 
policy.104 By the beginning of 2009, the primary military challenges for Denmark remained the 
pirates in Somalia and the ongoing war in Afghanistan. Fogh Rasmussen, however, still made a 
point of mentioning in his New Year’s Eve address to the nation that Danish soldiers and police 
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officers were deployed to Georgia, to ensure peace there.105 This is indicative of where he 
continued to perceive Russia as a threat, and which type of threat was most salient to Denmark. 
Fogh Rasmussen stepped down from his position as prime minister a few months later and took 
up the role of General Secretary of NATO. He took his focus on Russia with him – the first 
speech he delivered in the position, in September 2009, was titled “NATO and Russia: A New 
Beginning”.  
His successor back home in Denmark, Lars Løkke Rasmussen (V; no relation to either of 
the previous Rasmussens to also serve as prime minister), took a very different approach to 
Russia and to Danish security – this approach will be more closely detailed in later chapters. 
However, a clear theme that ran throughout all his policies across the board during his time as 
prime minister (2009-11 and 2015-19) was a strengthened focus on neighborhood policy. In 
2010, the Danish military was actively engaging in bilateral security cooperation with Ukraine, 
with a focus on three areas: strengthening security dialogue; strengthening Ukraine’s ability to 
participate in international peacekeeping; and strengthening democratic control using Ukraine’s 
armed forces.106 However, expenditure on military aid to Ukraine had been decreased by over 
half from 2009 to 2010 (6.3m DKK to 2.5m DKK), and was expected to be decreased even 
further (2.5m DKK to 1.75m DKK) from 2010 to 2011.107 Rasmussen did not at this time 
perceive Russia to be a military threat, so he focused Danish military efforts elsewhere. This was 
in line with the recommendations of the 2008 Defense Commission, this time titled Danish 
defense, Global engagement.108 Løkke Rasmussen did not have much time to implement his own 
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policies, however. He lost the October 2011 election and was replaced as prime minister by 
Helle Thorning-Schmidt (S).  
Thorning-Schmidt was a social democrat on the opposite side of the political spectrum 
and, incidentally, Denmark’s first female prime minister. Thorning-Schmidt announced in her 
opening address to Parliament that, though Denmark must continue to make a marked 
contribution to international missions, it “should not just be in the hard military missions. We 
must also take responsibility for the soft security. Here, Denmark has very much to offer.”109 
Russia featured relatively little in speeches she made during her tenure as prime minister, and she 
appeared not to consider it much of a military or security threat, even in light of the ongoing 
illegal Russian occupation of two Georgian territories. When asked why the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) allowed the sale of a certain weapon to Russia but not to Georgia, minister Villy 
Søvndal (SF) explained that, according to Denmark’s “reluctant” weapons export policy, the 
MFA had not assessed the sale of the weapon in question to be at risk for prolonging or 
escalating the conflict in Russia.110  
In 2012, Thorning-Schmidt announced, “We are reducing our defense spending on both 
sides of the Atlantic as part of our fiscal consolidation. This raises hard questions about burden 
sharing and our capacity to confront future security challenges.”111 This did not, however, reflect 
a rejection of transatlantic cooperation – in the same address, she highlighted Afghanistan and 
Libya as “examples of how NATO has adapted from Cold War confrontation in Europe to new 
types of conflicts outside Europe”.112 Denmark was still committed to its military alliances; it 
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was simply following the NATO line focusing on out-of-operations security. And at the time, 
Russia was not posing an active military threat to countries west of the Black Sea. 
In November 2013, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets of Kyiv to 
protest their government’s suspension of the signing of the planned Association and Free Trade 
Agreements between Ukraine and the EU. They, along with thousands of others in cities across 
the country, remained in the streets until February, when the protests culminated in the 2014 
Ukrainian Revolution. Pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych was ousted, and the democratic 
amendments made to the constitution a decade prior as part of the Orange Revolution were 
reinstated. These developments were highly concerning to Putin, who had also been concerned 
by the original color revolutions in the mid-2000s (the others were Georgia’s Rose Revolution 
and Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution). A week later, Russian soldiers without identifying insignia 
captured the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea; the Russian Federation announced Crimea’s formal 
incorporation in March 2014. Fighting also began in Eastern Ukraine that spring between 
Ukrainian government forces and pro-Russian separatist forces, later joined by Russian troops. 
This armed conflict is still ongoing as of May 2020. 
Ukraine triggered a massive reorientation of European security interests. After the spring 
of 2014, NATO pivoted its focus back to collective defense in Europe. The EU, alongside the US 
and Canada, implemented several rounds of sanctions against Russia for its actions. NATO 
augmented the strength of its Baltic Air Policing mission, established in 2004, and Denmark 
deployed fighter jets in support of this augmentation. On the 150th anniversary of the defeat of 
1864, Helle Thorning-Schmidt invoked for the first time the memory of the defeat as the catalyst 
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for Denmark’s active foreign policy today.113 This was additionally the first year that she tied 
energy security to European conventional security in one of her speeches.114 The old concept of 
indirect security from the 1990s also began to feature more strongly in her rhetoric after Ukraine. 
“We live in an uneasy time. And we have essentially two options. Either we help resolve the 
crises that are out in the world. Or, we bury our heads and hope that they don’t hit us. I’m not in 
doubt. We need to act,” she said at the opening of the 2014-15 parliamentary session.  “We need 
to fight outside for our security at home.”115  
Thorning-Schmidt was voted out of office in June 2015, and Lars Løkke Rasmussen 
returned to the seat of prime minister for a second time, this time until June 2019. However, he 
maintained a similar foreign policy to Thorning-Schmidt with regards to Ukraine and continued 
to support a political solution to the conflict there. One key difference in policy was that Løkke 
Rasmussen reinstated the defense funding that Thorning-Schmidt had cut some years earlier.116 
Increases in defense spending came following the deployment of Russian Iskander missiles in 
October 2016 to Kaliningrad, which could reach Copenhagen; it also followed an incident in 
2015 in which the Russian ambassador in Denmark “threatened to aim nuclear missiles at Danish 
warships if Denmark joined [a European missile defense system]”.117 It was clear from his and 
his government’s rhetoric that he wanted Denmark to be able to take better care of itself, rather 
than rely solely on powerful friends. This theme carried on even after he left office again in 2019 
– when President Trump attacked Denmark on Twitter for not spending enough on NATO 
contributions, Løkke Rasmussen tweeted back, “And – as i told You at the NATO Summit in 
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Bruxelles last year – we have had (proportionally) exactly the same numbers of casualties in 
Afghanistan as US. We always stands [sic] firm and ready – so we will not accept that our 
defence willingness is only about percentages.”118  
Following the 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw, Denmark also agreed to deploy several 
hundred soldiers to Estonia as part of the new Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) deterrence 
measure, intended to act as a tripwire of any new Russian aggression against the Baltic countries. 
Danish military buildup in the Baltic Sea region continues to be a staple fixture of Danish 
defense policy, especially as Russian military planes continually violated Danish airspace and, in 
several cases, simulated attacks on Danish targets in the years following 2014.  
Lars Løkke Rasmussen’s economic policy towards Russia during his first stint as prime 
minister arguably prioritized commercial and diplomatic interests over geopolitical concerns. 
This spilled over into some of his security policy towards Russia in the mid-2010s. In 2017, MP 
Mette Frederiksen (S) called on him to do more to link the concepts of energy and national 
security in the face of the impending Nord Stream 2 pipeline.119 After she replaced him as prime 
minister two years later, the pipeline was forced through and she was left to deal with what she 
had perceived to be a threat to national security, years in the past.  
Løkke Rasmussen’s minister of defense, Claus Hjort Frederiksen, also acknowledged at 
the same time that Denmark’s preoccupation for the past number of years with fighting terrorists 
meant that attention now needed to be turned back to the new threat landscape in Denmark’s 
neighborhood. This acknowledgement came in response to Mette Frederiksen’s colleague from 
the Social Democrats, Peter Hummelgaard Thomsen, arguing for the government to stop 
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separating commercial and security assessments when it came to Russia, specifically with regard 
to the growing threat of cyber attacks from Russia.120 A few months later, Hjort Frederiksen 
admitted that Russia had been hacking the Danish military for over two years, and that it was 
very likely that it was the Russian military intelligence-affiliated group Fancy Bear.121 
The primary challenge of Danish military relations with Russia, looking ahead from 
2020, will most likely take place in the Arctic. Norway, Russia, and the US are the actors who so 
far have taken the most steps as far as military armament in the High North go; however, 
increasing tensions, especially around areas such as the Norwegian island Svalbard, mean that 
NATO and the Arctic coast states are having to rewire their military strategies in the region. 
Denmark has reaffirmed its commitment to minimizing conflict in the Arctic, and perceives the 
Russian buildup there as largely defensive, but maintains that Russian developments also 
increasingly build out the capacity for offensive operations.122 Peaceful cooperation in the Arctic 
will ask Danish leadership to reconcile commercial energy and shipping interests, environmental 
preservation interests, issues of political representation with the Greenlandic people and self-
government, and security interests that balance the needs and signals of a very multipolar 
security community. Greenland’s strategic military value to the growing importance of the Arctic 
provided the first major international issue Mette Frederiksen had to deal with after her election 
in the summer 2020; the quickly growing military significance of the Arctic is likely to ensure 
that it will not be the last. 
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Political Relations 
 
 The broad strokes of Denmark and Russia’s military relationship capture their political 
relationship as well. Stated commitments by Danish leadership to either bilateralism or 
multilateralism more often than not refer back to the EU either way; in the case of certain Danish 
leaders and indeed most European politicians, NATO was also considered to be a political 
organization. Denmark took issue with human rights violations and unsuccessful democratic 
reforms in Russia. In Danish discourse, Europe was often framed as an institution rather than a 
geography. These were the defining political issues that guided their relationship, including a 
poor bilateral relationship for much of the 2000s. 
 By 1989, the dissolution process of the Soviet Union was already well on its way. In the 
three Baltic Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, anti-Soviet and anti-communist 
protests began several years earlier, as they did across much of the Soviet Union. Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost reform movements of the 1980s had the unintended 
consequence of releasing nationalistic sentiments in the republics that had for decades been 
repressed by Soviet military power. In the Baltics, protests at this time were directed against the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of fifty years earlier, which was responsible for secretly signing over 
the Baltic states to the Soviet sphere of influence and paving the way for their illegal annexation 
by the Soviet Union in 1940. Denmark, however, was at this time still prioritizing a bilateral 
relationship with the Soviet Union. This prevented it from fully supporting the independence of 
its Baltic neighbors, despite the local governments at this point being more in tune with the local 
majorities than the central Soviet government.123  
 
123 Runge Olesen 2014. 
56 
 
 
 
However, this non-recognition policy was officially dropped at the beginning of 1990. 
Politically, there was still disagreement in Denmark over how to best support Baltic 
independence. The political right took a hawkish approach that emphasized putting pressure on 
the Soviet government, “focused on the historical wrongs inflicted upon the Baltic countries by 
the Soviet Union and expected good Soviet behavior as proof that it was no longer the brutal 
great power it had been in 1940”.124 This expectation carried on through Danish and greater 
Western perceptions of Russia throughout the 1990s. The dovish left supported détente and 
feared taking any actions that could hurt democratic reform movements within the USSR;125 
these concerns were resolved at the end of 1991 with the Soviet Union’s implosion, and the new 
Baltic countries could now enjoy Denmark’s full political backing. Denmark was one of the first 
countries to establish diplomatic relations with all three new Baltic states. Of note and indicative 
of the intentions (based in the indirect security concept) behind Denmark’s strong support of 
Baltic independence was that Poul Schlüter’s government did not express the same level of 
support for the very similar Nagorno-Karabakh independence movement taking place at the same 
time in Azerbaijan, also a former Soviet republic.126 
In December 1991, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus undersigned the creation 
of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which would replace the USSR and which 
prompted Gorbachev to resign as President of the Soviet Union. The Danish prime minister Poul 
Schlüter (Conservative/Konservative, K) was overall very optimistic about the democratic, 
reform-minded direction that the former Soviet republics, including the new Russian state, were 
taking. Most of the Western world was as well, as it signaled a hopeful end to the Cold War, but 
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Denmark had specific interests tied to increased openness in the Baltic Sea region. Schlüter 
prioritized both solid international frameworks and assumption of responsibility by individual 
states.127 The Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) was formed in 1992, with Russia as one of 
the ten original members. The intention was to strengthen regional cooperation on three long-
term priority areas: Regional Identity, Sustainable and Prosperous Region, and Safe and Secure 
Region.128  
These were positive developments in regional cooperation, but it did not take long for 
friction points to arise in Denmark’s relationship to the new Russian state. The third of the 
CBSS’ priorities, Safe and Secure Region, was necessitated to a significant degree by the fallout 
of the Soviet Union’s breakup; one of its main focuses is upon human trafficking and fighting 
cross-border crime. In the early 1990s, Denmark experienced increases in Russian smugglers, 
who were granted asylum after being caught smuggling, and Russian human traffickers using the 
Danish-German border and the Kastrup Airport in Copenhagen.129 The head of the Danish 
Refugee Council (DRC) said in December 1993 that refugees coming from the Baltic countries 
or from Russia had no reason to claim refugee status, and should therefore be turned away at the 
border.130 The Danish and Swedish police were reportedly concerned that many of these refugees 
were traveling with the help of Russian organized crime groups linked to the international 
mafia.131 
Russian espionage in Denmark was another continuous point of tension in the countries’ 
political relationship throughout the 1990s. Already in 1992, Danish intelligence (PET) was 
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reporting that Russian spies were active in Denmark, and that this should be considered an 
expression of strain in the relationship, as well as considered in light of Russia’s recent 
application to the European Council.132 Keld Albrechtsen (Unity List/Enhedslisten, EL), an MP 
who raised a high number of questions about Russia in the parliament throughout the 1990s, 
asked the government to convince Russia that it was “unnecessary and unwise” for GRU, the 
Russian military intelligence service, to increase its activity in Western Europe in response to the 
planned expansion of NATO; evidently, a Moscow newspaper had announced that GRU 
received orders to do so.133 This was in November 1995; in the spring of 1996, the Russian 
embassy in Copenhagen installed security cameras that monitored the surrounding streets. The 
surveillance made Danes living in the area uncomfortable, and the Copenhagen police received 
several complaints about the cameras. The police responded that they did not have any 
information to provide about the function of the cameras, because they were a part of the 
embassy’s own security systems.134 And, as MP Anne Baastrup (Socialist People’s 
Party/Socialistisk Folkeparti, SF) pointed out, there had not been the need for “such indiscreet 
and comprehensive surveillance” prior to the spring of 1996.135 
Before leaving office at the end of January 1993, Schlüter commented cryptically on 
“worrying tendencies [in the former Soviet Union, including Russia] that contain meaningful risk 
for democratic development”.136 He possibly meant Boris Yeltsin’s reforms by decree the year 
before, a practice which allowed the Russian president to bypass the government’s legislative 
bodies. Either way, Schlüter and his right-leaning conservative government were replaced a few 
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weeks later by new prime minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen (Social Democrats/Socialdemokratiet, 
S) and his left-leaning government. After the failed coup against Yeltsin in October 1993, Nyrup 
Rasmussen expressed his government’s support for Yeltsin as “the best guarantee for the 
[political and economic] reform course” in Russia.137 A little more than a year later, Yeltsin sent 
Russian troops into Chechnya. Nyrup Rasmussen also announced that Denmark would be on the 
frontline of bringing Central European, Eastern European, and the Baltic countries into the 
EU.138 These were two developments that would soon converge and bring Denmark and Russia 
into a realm of political tension, and at times political conflict, for the next decade. 
Russian military actions in Chechnya were infamously brutal, and a high number of 
human rights abuses were committed by Russian soldiers on Chechen civilians.139 This quickly 
caught international attention, especially in Denmark. Member of parliament (MP) Bertel 
Haarder (Left/Venstre, V) asked Nyrup Rasmussen to limit or avoid entirely Danish 
representation in Russian victory ceremonies commemorating the 50th anniversary of the end of 
World War II, to protest the barbaric acts happening in Chechnya. “The democracies of the West 
have already been scandalously passive in this tragic case,” he argued. “The passiveness has 
strengthened the aggressive and undemocratic forces in Russia, while the liberal democrats have 
been left behind like in the ‘30s, when the West’s democracies displayed passiveness and thus 
made it easier for the dictators to crush democratic forces.”140  
The longer the conflict stretched on, the more political concerns it gave rise to in 
Denmark, which is rather removed geographically from the North Caucasus. Keld Albrechtsen 
 
137 Nyrup Rasmussen 1993. 
138 Nyrup Rasmussen 1994. 
139 Human Rights Watch 1996. 
140 Haarder 1995. 
60 
 
 
 
was worried that the Baltic countries’ poor treatment of their ethnic Russian minorities would 
give Russia an excuse to attack them.141 Holger K. Nielsen, a social democrat who would 
become minister of foreign affairs some twenty years later, called the Western response 
“embarrassing” and said it was “terrible that President Yeltsin, whom the West supported, fully 
backs up the murders”.142  
Neither the First Chechen War nor the Russian leadership’s behavior during it were 
promising in fulfilling the political right in Denmark’s expectation that the new Russia would 
distance itself from the brutality of the Soviet Union. The fears expressed by Albrechtsen and 
Haarder, who fall on opposing ends of the political spectrum, share a common image of Yeltsin’s 
Russia in the 1990s potentially playing the role of Hitler’s Germany in the 1930s, and Chechnya 
potentially serving as the catalyst for war returning to Europe and spilling into other countries 
closer to Denmark. These comparisons were made by Nyrup Rasmussen as well, in such a way 
that further reflected his apparent rhetoric-only approach. In reminding Danes of their country’s 
history choice to rescue nearly all Danish Jews from the Nazi during World War II, he said, “We 
did it – because we had to do it.”143 Later that year, he went as far as to call Chechnya a 
genocide; however, despite his earlier recall of Danish heroism in the face of genocide, this did 
not inspire any greater action from his government.144 
There is no evidence that these fears somehow informed Poul Nyrup Rasmussen’s stated 
aim of spearheading EU (or, for that matter, NATO) expansion to the east, which he had 
announced prior to the outbreak of war in Chechnya anyway. But by the end of the First Chechen 
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War, the Danish government’s objective of spreading EU and NATO membership to the Baltic 
countries specifically was well-established. This objective was also now, to a degree, inseparable 
from anxiety over a Russian invasion of the Baltic countries, although this anxiety stemmed 
mostly from conjecture at this point. Nyrup Rasmussen believed that eastward expansion of the 
EU linked peace and economy.145 Increasing the political ties of Denmark’s networks to the 
Baltic countries ostensibly would make Denmark more secure overall as an individual nation, in 
line with the Danish concept of indirect security.  
When the world entered the new millennium in 2000, Vladimir Putin had already come to 
power in Russia, and Russian troops had been sent into Chechnya for a second time; the Second 
Chechen War had begun. The battle phase of the war was relatively brief and lasted from August 
1999 to April 2000, when a military resolution was reached and federal government in Chechnya 
was restored. However, a longer insurgency phase between Chechen militants and Russian forces 
continued for much of the following decade. The mostly good relations between Russia and 
Denmark up until this point were likely due in part to their limited direct contact – most of their 
interactions took place in the common forum of Baltic state issues and development. It was 
during the Second Chechen War that Denmark’s interests in expanding the EU would converge 
with the conflict in Chechnya, and thereby bring Danish interests into contact with Russian ones. 
Poul Nyrup Rasmussen visited St. Petersburg, Russia, in September 2001 – his second to 
last month as prime minister – to speak at the summit of the Baltic Development Forum. Much 
of his speech focused upon the upcoming Danish presidency of the EU, and its primary objective 
of finalizing EU expansion to Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
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Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. “I want to underline that the enlargement will create 
opportunities for Russia and St. Petersburg,” he said. “Let us open that window to Europe.”146 
His words echoed a theme that would run throughout his successor Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s 
tenure as prime minister of Denmark: Europe is institutional, not geographical. Fogh Rasmussen 
(V) became prime minister in November 2001. Almost immediately, he reaffirmed his intentions 
to promote NATO and EU enlargement, while also expressing an intent to help Russia “to find 
its rightful place in European security politics”.147 His first year in office, however, brought him 
into conflict with Russia relatively quickly.  
Denmark assumed the EU presidency on July 1, 2002, and had the ambitious goal of 
concluding negotiations with the ten candidate countries in Copenhagen in December. 
Kaliningrad was the first issue. Originally called Königsberg, the port city on the Baltic was 
annexed away from Nazi Germany by the Soviet Union in 1945 and renamed Kaliningrad. The 
small region borders the Baltic Sea, Poland, and Lithuania – this meant that when the Soviet 
Union dissolved, Kaliningrad Oblast (an oblast is a federal administrative unit of the Russian 
Federation) became an exclave: a piece of Russia alone outside of the Federation. The impending 
accession of Poland and Lithuania to the EU would cause issues for Kaliningrad, the largest of 
which was the question of how Russian citizens would now travel between Russia proper and 
Kaliningrad.  
At the end of June, Jyllands-Posten, one of the largest newspapers in Denmark with a 
penchant for international controversy, published an article by a member of its leadership, which 
referred to Kaliningrad as “our time’s desperate, poor robbers’ nest” and suggested that the 
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region return to the EU as Königsberg.148 The Russian government, angered over the suggestion 
that Kaliningrad could undergo a change of borders, demanded an official reaction from the 
Danish government.149 Danish politicians were upset by this demand, which they viewed as a 
lack of respect by Russia for Danish freedom of expression and press. Jyllands-Posten’s chief 
editor Jørgen Ejbøl, meanwhile, requested that the Russians write a letter to the editor if they 
wanted a fight.150 Fogh Rasmussen made plans to resolve the issue of transit to Kaliningrad at 
the planned EU-Russia summit in November of that year, which was supposed to be held in 
Copenhagen. An unexpected diplomatic crisis in October, however, forced the summit to be 
moved to Brussels. 
When Chechnya declared independence from Russia in 1997, it did so under the 
leadership of a man named Aslan Maskhadov. Maskhadov was a veteran of the first war in 
Chechnya and continued to push for a political solution to the second, up until his death during a 
raid by the FSB in spring 2005. His close political ally, Akhmed Zakayev, was also a veteran of 
the conflicts, but left Chechnya soon into the Second Chechen War to seek medical attention. 
Rather than return to Chechnya, he stayed abroad, where he could act as an international 
spokesman for Maskhadov. At the end of October 2002, representatives of the Chechen 
separatist government organized a Chechen World Congress in Copenhagen, where they could 
meet and discuss the negotiation of a political solution to the war with Russia. The Congress 
opened on October 28; its opening, however, as well as its premise, were overshadowed by 
events in Moscow just a few days earlier.  
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On October 23, fifty or so Chechen terrorists stormed the Dubrovka Theater during a 
performance of the musical Nord-Ost and took hostage the sold-out audience of 850 people. The 
terrorists demanded an immediate end to the war in Chechnya – if Russian troops were not 
withdrawn within a week, they said, they would begin killing the hostages.151 Several hostages 
were killed over the next two days as the results of miscommunication or attempted escapes. On 
the morning of October 26, Russian special forces – the Spetsnaz – pumped a mysterious 
chemical gas into the theater, intended to sedate everyone inside before they launched an assault 
on the hostage takers. All of the terrorists were killed in the raid; however, the gas used by the 
Spetsnaz also killed over one hundred of the hostages.152  
Officially, the Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev claimed responsibility for the attack – 
Basayev was also the warlord whose actions in Dagestan and Chechnya in the summer of 1994 
served as the trigger for the Dagestan and First Chechen Wars. Although Basayev publicly stated 
that Chechen president Maskhadov had no knowledge of the attack, the Russian government 
accused Maskhadov of involvement anyway.153 Independently, multiple sources have alleged 
that the FSB staged the attack, including the renowned investigative journalist Anna 
Politkovskaya (assassinated on Putin’s birthday in October 2006) and former FSB agent 
Alexander Litvinenko (fatally poisoned a month after Politkovskaya).154  
Russia submitted a request through Interpol that Denmark arrest Zakayev, now in 
Copenhagen for the Chechen World Congress. Danish authorities did so, but refused to comply 
with the part of the request calling for Zakayev’s extradition. This refusal, combined with the 
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Danish government’s refusal to halt the Congress taking place in the wake of the theater crisis, 
caused the Danish-Russian relationship to plummet. The Danish foreign minister Per Stig Møller 
(Conservative People’s Party/Konservative Folkeparti, KF) expressed his regret for this 
downturn in an otherwise essential relationship, but simultaneously found it highly important 
that, now more than ever, moderate forces such as those gathered at the Congress continue to 
work together in pursuit of a political solution to the war in Chechnya.155  
Common themes among responses by Danish politicians to Zakayev’s arrest were 
displeasure that the Danish government had complied with Russia’s request and appreciation that 
it had not prevented the Congress from taking place, as this would have violated freedom of 
speech in Denmark. There was uncertainty, however, over what to do with Zakayev. If Denmark 
refused to extradite him, its options were to free him and risk further anger from Russia (which 
the right-wing MP Peter Skaarup described as a “friendly” nation) or to prosecute him and use 
Danish resources on the case; if Denmark chose to extradite him, it risked international criticism 
for human rights violations.156  
There are also indications that certain sectors of Danish politics were concerned, not just 
about criticism for violating Zakayev’s rights, but also for the actual wellbeing of Zakayev if he 
were sent back to Russia. Mogens Lykketoft (S) asked that the government wait to extradite him 
until it had first gone through the European Court of Human Rights – earlier that fall, Georgian 
president Eduard Shevardnadze had done the same thing in the face of Russian pressure to 
extradite the dozen or so Chechen terrorists recently detained in Georgia.157 The question of what 
had happened to these fighters upon their arrival in Russia remained one of interest to the 
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political left in Denmark, more often the Russia-skeptical side of the spectrum there, even after 
the resolution of the Zakayev case.158 The Danish government released Zakayev at the beginning 
of December, citing insufficient documentation in Russia’s initial extradition request to justify 
actually extraditing him. 
While this case played out during November 2002, Anders Fogh Rasmussen decided to 
move that month’s EU-Russia summit from Copenhagen to Brussels, so as to offset Putin’s 
threats of pulling out of the summit in response to the conflict with Denmark. The main issue on 
the table for this summit was that of transit between Russia and Kaliningrad once the countries 
surrounding Kaliningrad became EU members and thus adopted EU laws concerning cross-
border movement. Fogh Rasmussen was prepared to push right back on Russian pressure, and 
said on the plane to the summit that it did not matter whether an agreement came out of the 
summit or not; his foreign minister Per Stig Møller was, in contrast, concerned that Denmark 
would be painted as anti-Russian if the negotiations failed.159  
The negotiations, however, succeeded. The EU and Russia agreed to grant special travel 
documents to Russian citizens going to and from Kaliningrad. In the post-agreement press 
conference, a member of the Danish delegation was allowed to choose which questions could be 
asked to the heads of state; when a French reporter asked Putin about Chechnya, Putin lashed out 
and threatened the reporter with what he called a “final circumcision”.160 This odd exchange did 
give Putin and Fogh Rasmussen something else about which they could agree – after the press 
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conference, Fogh Rasmussen remarked, “You were quite right, that your own journalists are as 
critical as ours.” “They are bandits, all of them,” Putin replied, and the two men laughed.161 
Success at the Kaliningrad summit did not change the fact that the Chechen World 
Congress had set Danish-Russian relations on a powerful downward spiral. Compounding the 
immediate fallout of the clash, Fogh Rasmussen made eastward expansion of the EU and NATO 
the framework for Denmark’s Europe policy in the years to come.162 This would implicitly bring 
him, his country, and both organizations into conflict with Russia. Explicitly, Fogh Rasmussen 
saw Denmark’s opportunity to play an influential role in eastward expansion as its opportunity to 
cast off a century of “small state policy and appeasement policy with regards to first Germany 
and later the Soviet Union”.163  
In the winter of 2004, a number of Danish journalists were denied visas to Russia as 
retaliation for their critical coverage of the war in Chechnya, including the renowned Russia 
scholar Vibeke Sperling. At around the same time, the Russian government closed down the 
Danish Refugee Council’s office in Russia, significantly limiting how much humanitarian aid 
work Denmark could do in Chechnya, although it continued to financially support other aid 
organizations working in the Caucasus. MP Margrete Auken (SF) was not satisfied, saying, “It 
could easily be that Russia is saying, ‘Little Denmark over here, which happens to have a prime 
minister who called the Chechens a bunch of criminals – we could really screw them’.”164 She 
continued on to criticize her government for not doing much more other than speaking out 
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sharply against Russia, echoing sentiments expressed by other MPs on the same topic a decade 
earlier. 
Beginning in 2003, Fogh Rasmussen’s rhetoric grew markedly more anti-Russia and anti-
Soviet Union. Previously, when he mentioned Russia in speeches, it was almost always in a 
context of cooperation. But after the Chechen World Congress and the beginning of the 
downturn in Danish-Russian relations, he began to continually reference the Soviet Union and 
the shadow of communism over Eastern Europe during the twentieth century, and Denmark’s 
suppression from 1864-1945. Fogh Rasmussen’s rhetoric is a prime example of the conflict 
narrative in Rosanna Farbøl’s theoretical framework for the politicization of Denmark’s Cold 
War history; the conflict narrative demonizes the communist tyranny in the East, and lionizes the 
free democracies in the West, the defenders of freedom in the US, and the NATO loyalists in 
Denmark.165 Farbøl argues that it draws primarily from the so-called small state mentality 
Denmark developed across its century of defeat, and derives meaning from the Western 
“victory” over the Soviet Union.  
Nor did Fogh Rasmussen limit himself to deploying solely Danish historical experiences; 
in 2006, he hosted a 50th anniversary memorial concert in Copenhagen commemorating the 
Hungarian Revolution and took the speaking opportunity to further invoke the specter of 
Soviet/Russian villainy. In contrast, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen’s left-leaning government of most of 
the 1990s held that the past cannot be used as a compass.166 Danish researchers Mellander and 
Mouritzen conducted an analysis of Danish assertiveness under Fogh Rasmussen and concluded, 
“Until 2008 (including the April Bucharest summit [at which Georgia and Ukraine were 
 
165 Farbøl 2018. 
166 Farbøl 2018, p. 77. 
69 
 
 
 
effectively promised NATO membership]), there is not one single instance of Danish restraint. 
There is not the slightest effort to avoid insulting Russia…The intransigent and value-based 
Danish stance in connection with the Chechen Congress obviously represents an assertion 
leap”.167 
Leading up to that April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, Fogh Rasmussen argued 
fervently at home and abroad for the continued relevance of NATO, which he viewed as a 
political organization just as much as a military one.168 He supported the linkage of the EU and 
NATO missions. He also continued to push the idea that Europe is institutional, not 
geographical. When Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007, he said of the occasion, “As 
members of the European Union, Romania and Bulgaria are now regaining their rightful place in 
the European family of nations.”169 Fogh Rasmussen supported EU membership for Turkey, due 
to its long-running institutional ties to the EU and the various iterations that came before it, but 
he did not support EU membership for Russia. He used the same reason to justify NATO and EU 
membership for Ukraine and Georgia, which is by no means a unanimous opinion across either 
organization. Implicitly or explicitly taking this view of what is Europe allowed him to continue 
to keep Russia on the outside and as an “other”.  
This also adds a political dimension specifically to extending NATO membership to 
Ukraine and Georgia, which Fogh Rasmussen supported at the Bucharest NATO summit in April 
2008.170 Due to British, French, and German opposition, Georgia and Ukraine were not granted 
Membership Action Plans at the summit, but they received a commitment from NATO that they 
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would become memberships eventually – it was a matter of when. Russia was angered. “Russia 
will take steps aimed at ensuring its interest along its borders,” a Russian general told the press 
after the summit. “These will not only be military steps, but also steps of a different nature.”171 
Four months later, Russia invaded Georgia, recognized the independence of the Georgian regions 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and established an illegal occupation in both regions which is still 
ongoing.  
The Russo-Georgian War was an obvious turning point for Europe and for NATO – war 
had returned to Europe. Fogh Rasmussen was deeply concerned by the events in Georgia and 
supportive of the country’s sovereignty; his already-strong rhetoric against Russia underwent a 
clear increase following the war. As early as 2005, he had begun linking energy security to 
political issues and instability in energy supplier countries, ostensibly a response to the shutting-
off by Russia of gas to Ukraine in the winter of 2005. However, in most references between 2005 
and 2008, he refrained from calling out specific suppliers. After the war in August 2008, 
however, Fogh Rasmussen drew ever-clearer delineations between Russia as an undemocratic 
actor, Russia as a major gas and oil supplier, and the political risk involved in the West with 
continuing to grow energy dependency upon Russian resources.  
In October 2008, he expressed the need for a green revolution in the West, to put distance 
between Western energy consumption and greater need for various suppliers. “We must advance 
our freedom with a green revolution that reduces the power of totalitarian regimes,” he told the 
Danish parliament.172 Denmark did in earnest undertake the task of a green revolution – this will 
be covered further in the later chapter on energy. However, Anders Fogh Rasmussen left the post 
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of prime minister in April 2009 to become the Secretary General of NATO. While he had 
grounded the green revolution in political issues, his successor Lars Løkke Rasmussen (V) 
entered office with a different outlook on Danish-Russian relations, as well on the direction of 
the Danish economy; he instead grounded the green revolution in economic issues. This priority 
change in 2009 meant that Russia as a political threat was downgraded for the next five years, 
until Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2014 forced Europe and NATO to reorganize their 
security and political priorities.  
Løkke Rasmussen’s primary objective regarding Russia when he came into office was to 
salvage the rotten relationship he had inherited from the outwardly assertive Fogh Rasmussen. 
He was an arguably much more inwardly focused prime minister than Fogh Rasmussen, at least 
during his first stint as prime minister (2009-11). He and his foreign minister Lene Espersen 
came under fire from the Social Democrats for what they alleged to be a de-prioritization of an 
informal summit between the foreign ministers of the Arctic states. Though attendance at the 
summit included US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Russian foreign minister 
Sergei Lavrov, Espersen did not attend because she was on vacation with her family at the time; 
the justice minister attended in her stead.173  
Løkke Rasmussen’s friendlier approach to Russia had a rapid payoff – in April 2010, 
Russian president Dmitry Medvedev visited Denmark. It was the first time a Russian head of 
state had visited Denmark in fifty years. The focus of the visit was a modernization partnership 
between the two countries, signed during the visit. Putin, serving as prime minister at the time, 
made his own state visit to Denmark a year later, in April 2011. He and Løkke Rasmussen were 
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friendly as they stressed the economic closeness of their countries and their political ties over 
security in Afghanistan and development in the Baltic and Arctic regions, before ending the 
night with beers in Copenhagen’s Tivoli Gardens.174 Putin also visited Danish shipping giant 
A.P. Møller-Mærsk (known internationally as simply Maersk) during his brief visit. These 
bilateral visits, paired with the Nord Stream pipeline project (detailed in the next chapter), 
represented both a marked improvement in the bilateral relationship as well as Løkke 
Rasmussen’s focus on economic issues rather than political, security, or geopolitical.  
In October 2011, Løkke Rasmussen was replaced as prime minister by Helle Thorning-
Schmidt (S). Thorning-Schmidt arguably downgraded Russia as a political priority even more, 
although she was forced to deal with a Soviet-era scandal during her political campaign and 
cabinet formation process following her election. Ole Sohn (SF), who she named her minister of 
economic and business affairs, was a former member of the Danish Communist Party (DKP) and 
was the party’s chairman during the late 1980s. Allegations, which were then confirmed in 2012 
in a series of investigative articles published in Jyllands-Posten, emerged that he had personally 
received millions of Danish crowns (DKK) in cash from the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU) between 1987 and 1990. It was no secret that the CPSU funded communist 
parties, including the DKP, around the world. Sohn, however, claimed that he had never 
accepted cash from Moscow and never knew that others in DKP were doing so.175  
Valentin Falin, who had served as the last Soviet chief of all economic support to foreign 
communist parties, countered, “This doesn’t necessarily mean that Sohn personally got the 
money…but he was the addressee, so it isn’t a question of whether it happened with or without 
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his knowledge. Of course the chairman knew it.”176 Sohn continued to deny any knowledge of 
the DKP receiving money at all from Moscow, and this was where the scandal took root during 
the 2011 parliamentary elections. Thorning-Schmidt had to defend her decision to name him 
minister of economic and business affairs in light of his dishonesty, but she continued to express 
her confidence in him and refused to consider opening investigations against him.177 
The good relationship between Denmark and Russia, due to Lars Løkke Rasmussen’s 
efforts from 2009-11, combined with Helle Thorning-Schmidt’s own political focuses to ensure 
that there were few episodes of real significance to the bilateral political relationship before 
Ukraine in 2014. Not even an espionage scandal in April 2012 was able to derail the relationship; 
a Finnish professor teaching at the University of Copenhagen, Timo Kivimäki, was charged (his 
initial arrest came in September 2010) with delivering security policy assessments and 
information that could be of interest to the FSB during multiple meetings with contacts at the 
Russian embassy. The embassy employees suspected of espionage left Denmark before news of 
the case broke, per an agreement between Denmark and Russia. “We have no interest in this case 
burdening the otherwise good bilateral relationship,” foreign minister Villy Søvndal 
announced.178 
The Russian annexation of Crimea and fomentation of civil war in eastern Ukraine 
changed, as they did so many other things, political relations between Denmark and Russia. 
Helle Thorning-Schmidt, for one, significantly altered her rhetoric towards Russia. While she 
had overall made few references to Russia in her speeches up until that point, afterwards she 
began using an adaptation of Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s conflict narrative that played up 
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Denmark overcoming its legacy of defeat. Denmark supported the sanctions that the EU put in 
place against Russia, despite the potential negative effect that the sanctions (and Russia’s 
counter-sanctions) could have on the Danish agriculture and food sectors. It also used its EU 
Neighborhood Policy programs (which would be augmented under Lars Løkke Rasmussen’s 
second stretch as prime minister) to further strengthen democratic reform and civil society in 
Ukraine.179 Denmark continued to support a political solution to the crisis in Ukraine, a line 
which was upheld when Lars Løkke Rasmussen returned to the post of prime minister in June 
2015.  
Lars Løkke Rasmussen changed course from his earlier policy of friendly behavior 
towards Russia and became to speak more harshly on Russian conduct. This was slightly 
undercut by his foreign minister Kristian Jensen (V), who said in an interview with 
Weekendavisen in September 2015 that “Crimea has returned to Russia”, followed by, “Nowhere 
I’ve been in Europe is talking about how Crimea should be allowed to determine its own fate.”180 
Jensen clarified in a later interview that that had been his observation – the focus of the rest of 
Europe was on eastern Ukraine, not Crimea.181 While Jensen apparently did not really mean what 
he had said, there were certain other voices in Danish politics who did agree with his words, and 
believed them.  
Marie Krarup is a member of the right-wing nationalist populist party Danish People’s 
Party (Dansk Folkeparti/DF). In the 1980s, she trained as a Russian language officer with the 
Danish Army. In the 1990s, she began working in the Defense Ministry and was stationed at the 
Danish embassy in Moscow from 1998-2001 as a defense attaché. In 2011, she became a 
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member of parliament, and she went on to become the defense spokesperson for DF. Krarup’s 
opinions are so infamously pro-Russia that they played a role in breaking her longtime friendship 
with Danish journalist Anna Libak, who is openly critical of Russia and with whom she served at 
the embassy two decades earlier. In a 2018 documentary miniseries called Girlfriends in 
Putinland (Veninder i Putinland), the two traveled to Russia together and attempted to reconcile 
their friendship. “If the defense spokesperson in the country’s second largest party is working for 
us to not dissociate ourselves from a great power that takes parts of a neighboring state with 
military force, that makes them a security threat,” Libak says about Krarup in the 
documentary.182 “I’m mad at her because I think she’s speaking against her better knowledge 
about what Russia is. She can speak Russian, she knows well what’s happening. She lets her 
ideology blind her.”183  
Krarup was fired from her post as defense spokesperson for DF later in 2018 – the 
reasoning behind this decision, according to her successor Jeppe Jakobsen, appeared to be her 
opinions and statements about Russia.184 But throughout the 2010s, she has remained a constant 
voice advocating for the Russian side of international issues in Denmark, despite never really 
finding sympathy for these views elsewhere in Danish politics. In 2015, the EU established the 
East Stratcom taskforce, designed to combat Russian misinformation in Eastern Europe 
(including in Russia itself). Krarup appeared to feel personally attacked by her government’s 
support of the taskforce – she accused foreign minister Anders Samuelsen (Liberal Alliance, LA) 
of criminalizing “certain opinions, especially EU-critical and Islam-critical opinions”, opinions 
which she openly espouses.185 Samuelsen, in return, expressed concern that she had “publicly 
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questioned FE’s [the Danish Defense Intelligence Service] threat assessment of Russia”.186 
Krarup also objected strongly to the criminalization of knowingly abetting foreign influence 
campaigns in Denmark, which was passed in 2019. 
Over the next few years, Krarup became more and more outspoken; this meant that she in 
turn came under more and more criticism, including terms such as “useful idiot”, “fifth column”, 
“Putin’s friend”, and “traitor”.187 In the fall of 2016, she was widely criticized for saying that the 
EU poses a greater threat to Denmark than Russia. In response, she wrote an entire book 
defending her viewpoint, titled New Cold War (Ny Kold Krig), intended to portray the other side 
of the debate. In the introduction alone, she claims that uncontrolled immigration and 
Islamization are the real danger to Europe’s freedom.188 She also pins the Russo-Georgian War 
of 2008 fully on Georgia for attacking South Ossetia, which she calls “Russia’s ally” – implying 
that South Ossetia is indeed an independent and recognized state, capable of forming alliances.189 
Though Krarup’s party ultimately did not back her perspectives, her consistency and 
outspokenness cannot be denied; she remains a key voice in those spheres of Danish politics that 
concern Russia. 
Though almost always alone in Denmark in her views, Marie Krarup does represent a 
certain Danish political perspective about Russia; she stands across from voices such as Keld 
Albrechtsen in the 1990s or Anders Fogh Rasmussen in the 2000s. Fogh Rasmussen, for his part, 
stopped serving as Secretary General for NATO in 2014 and has continued to fight against 
Russia as a private citizen. In 2016, while working as an external advisor to Ukrainian president 
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Petro Poroshenko, he put together the Friends of Ukraine initiative, which his website describes 
as “a group of leading politicians and former senior diplomats…[which] seeks to make the case 
for why a reformed and European Ukraine matters”.190 In September 2019, he attended the 5th 
Annual Tbilisi International Conference in Georgia, where he argued a case for how Georgia 
could still join NATO in such a way that “would show Russia that creating frozen conflicts can’t 
forever freeze Georgia’s future”.191  
In 2018, the Danish Defense Intelligence Service reported that there was a threat of 
Russian interference in coming Danish elections. The Russian embassy in Denmark tweeted out 
a sarcastic response to the report, saying, “Since there is no difference in russophobic approach 
between #DK Government and opposition, meddling into DK elections makes no sense”.192 
Politically, Denmark remains largely unfriendly towards Russia, a reality of which Russia is 
cognizant. Mette Frederiksen, prime minister for less than a year as of May 2020, appears to 
uphold the same line on Russia that has reigned in Danish politics since the beginning of the 
Ukraine crisis. She is likely to carry on this firm outlook towards Russia, due to the continuing 
dynamics in the bilateral relationship such as unsatisfactory (from the Western perspective) 
institutional reforms in Russia, continuing Russian aggression in its neighborhood, and now new 
changes in the Danish-Russian energy-economic relationship. 
Economic Relations 
 
 The two most important things to understand for the economic relationship between 
Denmark and Russia are the Danish policy of tying security to development aid, and the 
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European energy sector. When the Soviet Union and communism in Eastern Europe were 
crumbling, Poul Schlüter and the rest of the world were reading the writing on the wall. Going 
into the 1990s, the Danish government was seeking to expand investment opportunities in 
Eastern Europe. It hoped to link this economic initiative, which would be to the benefit of the 
Danish business community, with support for reforms towards political pluralism and human 
rights in the new democracies emerging in the east.193 The Øststøtte (“East support”) program 
was intended to build on this, and in 1991 an aid commission was established which listed 
Eastern Europe and the USSR as a priority. The concept of indirect security was not codified into 
Danish defense policy until the end of the decade, and later governments would make more 
explicit connections between Danish security and economic development policy. The early 
efforts of Schlüter’s government to bolster political reforms in Eastern Europe, particularly in the 
Baltic countries, can however be interpreted as an early iteration of this concept. 
 Denmark’s interactions with Russia throughout the 1990s largely took place through the 
Baltic countries. Though Denmark was outwardly optimistic about the evolution of the new 
Russian state (with a dip following the outbreak of war in Chechnya), its concerted efforts to 
economically build up the Baltic countries specifically indicate a targeted policy of building a 
buffer zone in the Baltic Sea region, should one again become necessary. Kaliningrad and the 
northwestern region of Russia, with St. Petersburg at the epicenter, were also included in these 
concerted efforts. As an example, the Danish government amended the existing export credit law 
to help Danish companies invest and build infrastructure in the Baltic Sea region, especially in 
the energy sector, where Denmark possesses strong technical expertise.194 This sort of support 
 
193 Udenrigsministeriet 1989. 
194 Lundholt 1992; Erhvervsministeriet 1992. 
79 
 
 
 
for economic development in the Baltic states and in Russia comprised the most meaningful 
economic interactions between Denmark and Russia throughout the 1990s. Trade numbers were 
overall insignificant between them. Denmark’s top export to Russia during this time was 
agricultural products, and its top import from Russia was fuel-related products.  
Danish policy in the Baltic Sea region during the 1990s focused on the nexus of 
economics, politics, and security policies; beyond aid contributions earmarked for the economic 
development of the Baltic Sea region, economics appeared to take a backseat among Danish 
members of parliament, in favor of more pressing political and security concerns. In the late 
‘90s, plans for eastward expansion of the EU and NATO gained traction in the international 
community and were spearheaded in part by Denmark. Economic concerns began to assume a 
greater role again, as Poul Nyrup Rasmussen’s government painted EU expansion as the linkage 
of peace and economy. Theoretically, deeper and more numerous trade ties are supposed to 
decrease the propensity of conflict between countries that share the same network, if they do not 
already trade directly with one another.195 The Baltic countries have long relied on Russia as 
their largest trading partner, and as the centralization and internal markets of the Soviet Union 
disappeared, this partnership continued to be of high importance. If Denmark increased its trade 
ties with the Baltic countries, and in turn increased the dependence of those countries upon 
Danish investments, so too would Russia be brought into this deepened trade network.  
Nyrup Rasmussen explained it as wanting to be a country that others could count on. “To 
do something for others is to be something. Especially when one does a little more than one 
needs to do,” he said in his New Year’s Eve address in 1998.196 This provides an idealistic and 
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value-driven rhetorical frame for economic aid as a tool of security policy, which would continue 
to be a key pillar of economic relations between Denmark and Russia over the coming decades. 
Russia’s heavy involvement and influence within its neighboring countries make it difficult to 
speak of one and not mention the other, particularly in the wake of Russia’s ongoing military 
engagements in Georgia and Ukraine. Russia interprets NATO and EU expansion towards its 
borders as military and political-economic encirclement, respectively, by the West. Denmark’s 
support and participation in both is compounded by its significant financial aid invested in 
Russia’s immediate neighborhood – in the 1990s, that aid mostly went to Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania. 
The state of the Danish-Russian economic and commercial relationship in the years 
following the Soviet Union’s breakup laid foundational conditions for components of their 
overall relationship in the decades to come. Direct bilateral trade between Denmark and Russia 
was low, meaning that Denmark did not stand to lose catastrophically if its relations with Russia 
were to be disrupted. There was also little room for asymmetry in their limited trading 
relationship, eliminating a possible source of pressure or power dynamics that small countries 
can often experience with larger trade partners. Relatedly, Denmark also did not depend on 
imports of Russian gas or oil and had actually achieved energy self-sufficiency for the first time 
in 1997.197 Russia’s economy depends upon its large wealth of natural resources, which Putin 
quickly took steps to seize control of early on in his reign. Its position as a major supplier of oil 
and gas to Europe (and, to increasing degrees in the 2010s, China) gives it a certain amount of 
influence over various importers of these resources, although more so gas than oil.  
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Denmark lacked this significant economic tie to Russia, so actions that put it in 
opposition with Russia were of a lower cost than they would be for a country that depended more 
greatly upon Russian resources. Support for Denmark among some of the Western-oriented 
countries bordering Russia was also high, thanks to Danish investments there throughout the 
1990s. Environmental protection efforts in the Baltic Sea region were an important area of 
economic cooperation throughout the 1990s and were a priority of Danish Øststøtte money going 
towards Russia, along with Poland and the Baltic countries, up through 2002. Entering the new 
decade and millennium, therefore, the conditions were there for Denmark to afford to take up a 
hard posture against Russia, which it did beginning in that year. 
This was when the controversy surrounding the Russia-ordered arrest of Chechen 
separatist leader Akhmed Zakayev in Copenhagen took place, unfortunately at the same time as 
the deadly Dubrovka theater crisis in Moscow. The political falling-out between Russian 
president Vladimir Putin and Danish prime minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen that occurred as a 
response led to tense relations between the two countries for most of the 2000s. Figures released 
by the Danish government in 2012 revealed that, from 2000 to 2011, Danish exports to Russia 
increased 9.8% annually.198 In spite of this increase, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Austria, 
Belgium, and Holland were all able to increase their exports to Russia in the same time period by 
so much that Denmark’s share of exports across that aggregated group fell from 4.2% in 2000 to 
2.6% in 2011.199 Increased Russian trade with all of the other countries in this reference group is 
a possible indicator of a Russian unwillingness to engage the Danes as much in the wake of the 
Zakayev scandal and the resulting distance in the relationship between the two countries. 
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Shipping has long been a major industry for both countries. Denmark’s position at the 
mouth of the Baltic Sea, where the Skagerrak and Kattegat straits connect the Baltic to the North 
Sea, gives it strategic value both militarily and commercially. The Baltic Sea is of high 
importance to the Russian shipping industry – if it were to lose shipping access in the Baltic, for 
example due to a NATO blockade, it could redirect shipping through its Arctic and Pacific ports, 
but this would be quite costly to do.200 These geographical realities for each country mean that, 
even if overall relations are going through a low, there is still guaranteed interaction in this sector 
at the very least. Russia increased its shipping traffic through the Baltic in the early 2000s, 
because it opened a new oil terminal at the Primorsk port in 2001. By 2015, Primorsk was 
shipping a third of Russia’s total oil exports, which comes out to approximately 70 million tons 
of oil daily.201  
However, in the early 2000s there were issues with Russian ships passing through Danish 
waters, particularly around the Storebælt bridge connecting the Danish islands of Sjælland and 
Fyn, without pilots.202 This was a serious concern for the Danish government – the sailing route 
there is inherently difficult, and an increase in oil tankers, as well as an increase in ships not 
utilizing pilots, meant there was an increased risk for ship collisions that would endanger human 
lives and environmental conditions, particularly if there were a resulting oil spill. There was 
frustration on the Danish side that, despite Russia’s expansion of its oil shipping capacity, there 
was no response by Russian authorities to Danish pressure about increasing security by forcing 
Russian ships to use pilots.203 Anders Fogh Rasmussen mentioned the persistent issue as well 
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during his address at the 6th Baltic Development Forum Summit, which was held in September 
2004 in Hamburg, Germany.204 
Overall, however, it was clear that Fogh Rasmussen, a known hardliner on Russia, did 
not really consider bilateral economic cooperation with Russia to be a priority, unlike his 
eventual successors as prime minister. Especially during the mid-2000s, he referred to expanding 
economic cooperation with the US, the EU, and China, but not to Russia. This common 
omission, in contrast to rhetoric by later prime ministers and in tandem with the earlier-cited 
figures showing Denmark being outpaced by its peers in the EU with regards to exports to 
Russia, was apparently deliberate. At around the same time, in the winter of 2006, Russia shut 
off gas supplies to Ukraine in the middle of a dispute over gas prices. This was not an isolated 
incident – a 2007 report by the Swedish Defence Research Agency found 55 occasions upon 
which Russia had shut off or threatened to shut off energy deliveries to other countries between 
1992 and 2006, almost all of which were for political reasons.205 
 Gas and oil imports from Russia by Denmark have historically been negligible. Denmark 
owns its own oil and gas fields in the North Sea, and primarily imports additional energy from 
Norway. More importantly, Denmark’s massive progress in the renewable energy technology 
sector since the scare of the 1970s oil crisis made it one of the European countries with the 
highest energy security in electricity by 2018 and the first to source half of its electricity 
consumption from wind by 2020.206 But a decade before these figures became a reality, the shift 
to primarily sustainable energy systems was still underway. The Social Democrats first broached 
the subject of Russia as an unstable energy supplier on 27 January 2006, a little less than a month 
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after Russia shut off (and then restored) the gas to Ukraine, and posed it as a motivator for 
increasing efforts towards sustainable energy in Denmark.207 Potential gas disruptions to the 
Baltic countries were also a concern in Denmark.  
The Baltic countries became EU members in 2004, fulfilling a political and economic 
goal of the Danes, but in 2006 the EU forced Lithuania to shut down its Ignalina nuclear power 
plant, one of its most important energy sources. The Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, 
DF) argued that doing so, and thereby forcing Lithuania to become completely dependent upon 
Russian energy, would open the door to a “Russian offensive”.208 Foreign minister Per Stig 
Møller responded that it would be the policy of the Danish government to aid in modernizing 
Lithuania’s energy production, transmission, and distribution sectors.209 At the same time, 
Danish economic aid was also going towards democracy and human rights groups in Belarus, 
economic development programs in Russia’s Kaliningrad and Pskov oblasts, and civil society 
capacity building in the North Caucasus, all through Denmark’s Neighborhood Program.210 
Economic aid continued to be used as a tool of foreign policy in countries neighboring Russia, 
intended to create external pushback on what Holger K. Nielsen (Socialist People’s 
Party/Socialistisk Folkeparti, SF) called a country “moving quickly in the direction of a 
dictatorship”.211  
As EU expansion also began to run up against its limits as a “stability generating 
instrument”, Fogh Rasmussen placed a greater premium on making Danish neighborhood 
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policies more attractive to the countries in which they would be operating.212 This economic 
objective ties in with his stated desire to target active, preventive Danish foreign and security 
policy towards dealing with problems “exactly where they arise”.213 Starting in 2006, Fogh 
Rasmussen’s speeches began to focus much more on the issue of energy supply security for 
Denmark. He made frequent references to rejecting dependence upon politically unstable 
countries and regions for the purchase of gas and oil, though he did not initially name specific 
countries or regions. He did, in 2007, mention that the increasing concentration of fossil fuel 
production in Russia, and increasing European dependency upon that production, was a source of 
vulnerability for Europe.214  
At this time, Russia and Germany were well underway with a gas pipeline project in the 
Baltic Sea that they called Nord Stream. The idea for Nord Stream was first pitched in 1997, it 
was recognized by the EU as a “project of common interest” in 2000, and by 2005 the design 
process and negotiation of contracts had begun in earnest under the auspices of the Nord Stream 
AG company, in which the Russian state-owned gas giant Gazprom is the majority 
stakeholder.215 The project was presented as one that would increase European energy security 
by providing up to 55 billion cubic meters of Russian gas yearly. The pipeline would run from 
Vyborg in northwestern Russia to Greifswald in northern Germany, passing along the way 
through the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of Russia, Finland, Sweden, and Germany, as well 
as the territorial waters of Russia, Germany, and Denmark.216   
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The Baltic countries and Poland were almost immediately opposed to the project, as their 
own experiences with Russia as their majority gas supplier had not been positive. Despite Fogh 
Rasmussen’s repeated resistance to Russian engagement, and explicit statements beginning in 
March 2007 that increased energy imports from Russia made Europe more vulnerable, he was 
positive about Nord Stream. In February 2007, a month before he first mentioned Russia as 
increasing European vulnerability, he told Polish prime minister Jarosław Kaczyński that the 
pipeline would contribute to Europe’s energy security. “Denmark will not interfere in Germany’s 
and Russia’s decision to lay a gas transmission line in the Baltic Sea between the two countries,” 
he announced.217  
Fogh Rasmussen’s rhetoric was supportive of the Baltic countries’ concerns, and he had a 
history of standing up for them – as an example, in 2005 he was one of several Western leaders 
who demanded Putin issue an apology to the Baltic countries for their earlier annexation and 
occupation by the Soviet Union. However, his support of Gazprom’s Nord Stream project and 
statements to Kaczyński flew in the face of his Baltic Sea region neighbors’ fears about the 
pipeline, as well as his own stated opposition to purchasing more gas and oil from Russia. The 
incongruity between Fogh Rasmussen’s words and actions is both compounded and perhaps 
explained by a business deal concluded in the summer of 2006. 
Denmark has its own state energy company, formerly known as DONG (Dansk Olie og 
Naturgas/Danish Oil and Natural Gas) but renamed in 2017 to Ørsted. Before 2006, Denmark 
had never purchased gas from Russia. In the summer of that year, Ørsted signed a deal with 
Gazprom, under which Ørsted would purchase 1 billion cubic meters of gas annually for twenty 
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years, beginning in 2011.218 Ørsted would also be delivering gas from a Norwegian gas field to 
Gazprom’s UK subsidiary, per a separate deal signed at the same time.219 The Executive Vice 
President of Ørsted who negotiated the deal, Kurt Bligaard Pedersen, became a managing 
director with Gazprom in 2014 and went on to become CEO of its UK division, a position he still 
holds as of May 2020.  
It is likely that this enormous contract between the Danish state-owned energy enterprise 
and its Russian counterpart was a factor in Fogh Rasmussen’s support of Nord Stream; this also 
appears to be the first major instance of an apparently emerging pattern in which geopolitical and 
security concerns in Denmark were subjugated to economic ones when it came to Russia. In May 
2007, three months after his promising words to Kaczyński and just under a year after the 
conclusion of the Ørsted-Gazprom deals expanding cooperation at home and in the North Sea, 
Fogh Rasmussen told his parliament, “[The North Sea] has given supply security and a good 
economy. But one day, the adventure in the North Sea will end. And on that day, we must have 
other energy sources ready to ensure that Denmark can continue to supply itself with energy. We 
do not want to be dependent upon buying oil and natural gas from countries and regions that will 
abuse energy supplies as a tool of foreign and security policy.”220 
In August 2008, Russia invaded the small former Soviet republic of Georgia. Russia had 
spent much of the year engaging in increasingly provocative actions towards Georgia and in its 
separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, culminating in the mobilization and assembly 
of Russian forces along the border between Russia and South Ossetia during the first week of 
August. When Georgian forces responded to aggression from South Ossetian positions, Russian 
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troops were ready to move in.221 The war lasted five days. During that time, Russian forces 
bombed the country, including attempts at bombing the strategically essential Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan oil pipeline; caused massive refugee displacement; and came within 25 miles of taking 
the Georgian capital, Tbilisi. US diplomat Ronald Asmus argued that the Russian offensive had 
the objective of signaling to Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili, who was one of the 
instrumental figures in Georgia’s democratic Rose Revolution in 2003 and who built close ties to 
the US and to NATO, that Putin would not tolerate Georgia’s attempts to go west.222 It is 
additionally important to note that this narrative of events is drawn from Western and Georgian 
sources, and the Russian government’s version of events is very different from the one described 
here. 
At the Bucharest NATO summit in April 2008, NATO promised eventual membership to 
Georgia and Ukraine; supporters of this promise included Anders Fogh Rasmussen. One of the 
consequences of the war was an illegal military occupation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia by 
Russian troops, and Russian recognition of both regions as sovereign states. The existence of 
these territorial disputes is a blocking factor in Georgia’s hopes of NATO accession, according 
to a 1995 NATO study on expansion.223 The context of this war is important, because it provides 
the context for further economic relations between Denmark and Russia that would downgrade 
political and security interests in favor of economic gain. Though energy security, in all its 
forms, has been a Danish priority for decades, and though Denmark has made great strides in the 
technical aspects of achieving energy security, the government, Danish companies, and 
sometimes both have a less stellar record on Russian energy deals affecting the energy security 
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of other countries. Nord Stream and its companion pipeline Nord Stream 2, which will be 
covered later, are highly publicized and much-discussed examples of this. A much more obscure 
example can be found further from home, in Georgia some two thousand miles away.  
When Putin made a state visit to Denmark in April 2011, his first ever, he visited only 
three parties: Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen; Queen Margrethe II; and the headquarters 
of A.P. Møller-Mærsk, or Maersk, the world’s largest shipping company. At Maersk, he 
discussed the need for investment in Russia’s port infrastructure, as well as Gazprom’s search for 
partners to explore the Arctic for gas and oil reserves; Rosneft, the Russian state’s massive oil 
company, was considering Maersk for the same task.224 In 2009, Maersk CEO Nils Smedegaard 
Andersen had begun to investigate emerging market opportunities in Russia. Maersk launched a 
new transatlantic service between St. Petersburg and Ecuador in 2010. At the opening ceremony 
(attended by Putin, Løkke Rasmussen, and Smedegaard Andersen), the Danish prime minister 
declared, “I am glad and proud that a Danish company is opening a new door together with its 
Russian partners. This is an example of our bilateral relations, of our trade with you.”225  
The opening ceremony was held at the Petrolesport container terminal at St. Petersburg’s 
Bolshoi Port. Petrolesport is owned by Global Ports Investments, which was founded by 
Transportation Investments Holding Limited (TIHL) in 2008 and is based out of Cyprus, a 
known destination for Russian money laundering; TIHL co-founder Konstantin Nikolaev is 
connected to Putin’s close circle of associates.226 APM Terminals (APM), a subsidiary of 
Maersk, bought 37.5% of Global Ports in September 2012 and became co-controller, alongside 
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TIHL, of Russia’s largest port operation company.227 The same month of Putin’s 2011 visit, 
APM purchased the seaport in Poti, a city on Georgia’s Black Sea coast, and announced its plans 
to transform the port into a new deep-water port. Without certain knowledge about Black Sea 
regional politics and Georgian domestic politics, this investment may seem unremarkable, or at 
least no more remarkable than any of the other 78 ports APM operates. However, APM’s 
purchase of Poti further illustrates Maersk’s self-interested ties to Moscow’s political leadership. 
In October 2012, Mikheil Saakashvili lost the parliamentary election to Bidzina 
Ivanishvili, a Georgian billionaire who has close ties to the Kremlin. That same month, Georgian 
businessman David Iakobashvili acquired assets previously held by Davit Kezerashvili, a former 
defense minister under Saakashvili.228 Through parent companies, Iakobashvili is the owner of at 
least two terminal operators at the APM-owned Poti port. The month after, Iakobashvili acquired 
80% ownership of Petrocas Energy, a Cyprus-based oil transit company operating in the South 
Caucasus and Central Asia’s Caspian region.229 He has a history of conducting business with 
Bidzina Ivanishvili in Russia, where both men made their fortunes. Further financial ties between 
Ivanishvili, the Poti seaport, and APM are alleged by members of the political opposition in 
Georgia and former Georgian ambassador to the US Batu Kutelia.230  
Several months later, in February 2013, the Kremlin’s chief of staff, Sergei Ivanov, 
declared the Danish shipping company to be a “strategic investor” for Russia.231 A year after 
that, in February 2014, war broke out in Ukraine. Maersk’s intensified commercial efforts in 
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Russia meant that it could stand to lose heavily if economic ties between Russia and the EU were 
broken or damaged by the conflict. Maersk said it was “following the developments in the 
relationship between Russia and the EU with concerns”, emphasizing that relationship rather 
than the actual crisis in Ukraine.232 Rosneft was one of the companies sanctioned by both the US 
and EU. In December 2014, in a move condemned by the Georgian government, Rosneft 
purchased one of the four oil terminals at the APM-owned Poti seaport from David 
Iakobashvili’s Petrocas Energy.233 Poti is the only port in Georgia that can unload oil products 
from tankers. Russian control of even one oil terminal at Poti allows Rosneft control over oil 
flows through Georgia to the EU from Russia’s competing oil producers on the Caspian Sea. 
Before leaving office, Saakashvili had proposed the idea of building Georgia’s first deep-
water port. Deep-water ports can accommodate larger ships and therefore more types of goods; 
these larger ships could potentially include NATO warships. After Ivanishvili came to power, he 
picked up the idea and suggested Anaklia, a town only fifteen miles north of Poti and essentially 
on the Abkhazian border. The port project, led by the US-funded Anaklia Development 
Consortium (ADC) and the Georgian bank TBC Holding, was approved by the Georgian 
government in 2016. APM had already announced in 2011 its intentions to transform Poti into a 
deep-water port; there were now two rival projects being planned a very short distance apart, and 
with very different backers. 
Russia opposes a Georgian deep-water port, as this would make Georgia more valuable to 
NATO and provide commercial competition for the nearest deep-water port, which is the 
Russian port of Novorossiysk. In 2018, APM’s partner in the Global Ports Investment group, the 
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Putin-associated TIHL, sold its shares to another Russian business group, the Delo Group. The 
Delo Group is one of the primary operators at the port of Novorossiysk. APM, which already 
owned a third of Russia’s largest port operator through its stake in Global Ports, was now 
working with a major stakeholder in one of Russia’s largest seaports, which would also stand to 
lose commercially from the Anaklia or Poti projects. Moscow has a history of making “attempts 
to influence strategically important projects in the South Caucasus region in order to split the 
participants or slow down the initiatives’ implementation”.234 Rosneft’s ownership of the oil 
terminal at Poti, plus Delo’s partnership with APM, means Russia would at least have some 
meaningful control over this piece of infrastructure. 
Mamuka Khazaradze, one of the heads of the Anaklia port project and a member of the 
political opposition in Georgia, claimed in 2018 that APM had been counter-lobbying Anaklia 
for a long time.235 At the end of May 2019, it was revealed that an unauthorized land use permit 
was granted to APM’s Poti project earlier in the month.236 The permit was canceled, but ADC 
argued that the whole affair was evidence of a conspiracy against Anaklia.237 In 2018 and 2019, 
investigations were opened against Khazaradze, ostensibly to slow down progress in Anaklia and 
spook investors.238 In October 2019, Anaklia’s principal US investor backed out of the project.239 
Then finally, in January 2020, the Georgian government cancelled ADC’s contract to build a 
deep-water port in Anaklia. The official reason was that ADC had failed to secure enough 
funding for the project; however, multiple political parties opposing Georgian Dream said that 
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the decision was totally political.240 Meanwhile, APM announced just one month later that it was 
formally reinitiating the process to obtain permits for port expansion in Poti.241 Knowingly or 
otherwise, APM and its parent Maersk are serving as a pawn of Bidzina Ivanishvili and Vladimir 
Putin, and contributing to a source of political instability and energy security in Georgia, an 
important strategic partner of the West.  
These actions came at the same time as the Danish government’s own reorientation 
towards greater support of Georgia and Ukraine through its neighborhood policy. In 2011, Lars 
Løkke Rasmussen, while addressing the annual meeting of the ambassadors in Copenhagen, said 
that economic development aid would continue to be an integral element of Denmark’s active 
foreign policy, but that “to ensure that we get the most out of our assistance and make a real 
difference, we must also be ready to focus on fewer countries and sectors”.242 This thinking was 
on display in 2016 when the foreign ministry released its new neighborhood policy for Eastern 
Europe, 2017-21. Previous iterations of the policy had as priority countries Belarus, Ukraine, 
Moldova, Armenia, Albania, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The new policy focused only on Georgia and 
Ukraine. When asked to comment upon this new policy, foreign minister Anders Samuelsen 
explained that “cooperation partners in the neighborhood region have changed since 2005, in that 
both country composition, context, necessity, and challenges have also changed”.243 The foreign 
ministry had also told Kyiv Post that this was due to budget cuts, but the refocusing of the policy 
from a wide range of countries down to the two most threatened by Russia is a clear statement of 
intent all the same.244 
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The apparent attempt to economically and financially help bolster Ukraine and Georgia 
against Russian aggression was at odds with the economic policies towards Russia that Løkke 
Rasmussen carried out during his two periods as prime minister from 2009-11 and 2015-19, and 
that Helle Thorning-Schmidt upheld as prime minister during the intervening 2011-15 period. As 
was discussed earlier, Løkke Rasmussen’s efforts to heal the Danish-Russian bilateral 
relationship presented primarily as strengthening commercial ties between the two countries. 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen had pitched Denmark’s need for a green revolution as one of increasing 
Danish energy security individually and independence of Russian and Middle Eastern energy. 
Løkke Rasmussen adapted this green revolution idea away from a political foundation and 
towards an economic one. His “green economy” concept focused on developing green 
technology as “a massive commercial opportunity”.245 When mentioning volatile energy 
suppliers, he either refrained from naming names, or named the Middle East. The 2014 Ukraine 
crisis did incite an overall change in his rhetoric, however, when he returned to office in 2015. 
Helle Thorning-Schmidt made green growth an even larger component of her energy 
policy when she became prime minister in October 2011. Her approach to energy challenges had 
a greater focus on social justice, emphasizing inclusive accessibility to clean energy and 
highlighting the need for responsibility in national green transitions. Neither geopolitical 
concerns nor energy security factored meaningfully into speeches she delivered on the topic of 
energy policy. She also took up Løkke Rasmussen’s task of growing trade ties with Russia. In 
December 2011, Mariann Fischer Boel was appointed export ambassador to Russia, in 
conjunction with the release of the government’s Russia-specific market growth strategy report 
in 2012. The report focused on the healthcare and efficient energy sectors as new and promising 
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markets in Russia for Danish companies to tap into it, as well as established business networks 
there in which dozens of Danish companies are already participants. Objectives of the 
government were identified as building relationships with the central decision-makers in Russia 
in order support business efforts and advancing the narrative in Russia that Denmark is a green 
progressive country.246 
However, Helle Thorning-Schmidt was also in office when Russia annexed Crimea and 
stoked a civil war in eastern Ukraine. This put her in the position of having to deal with a unique 
strain on Danish-Russian economic relations – the sanctions regimes that the EU and Russia 
have placed against each other. There were three rounds of Western sanctions, all of which are 
still in effect: diplomatic sanctions; visa bans and asset freezes against individuals and 
organizations; and economic sanctions against Russia’s financial, defense, and energy sectors.247 
Russian countersanctions included an annually renewed ban on Western agricultural food 
exports (fruit, vegetables, meat, fish, and dairy). This ban was the one that would most affect 
Danish exporters, as Denmark is a large exporter of specifically pork and dairy products and has 
historically counted the Russian market for these products as an important one.  
There were concerns over how greatly this would affect the Danish agricultural sector, 
but the minister of environment and food reported that the drop in food exports had been covered 
by an increase in exports to other countries.248 The position of the foreign ministry upon 
upholding the EU sanctions regime, in response to skepticism expressed by MP Marie Krarup, 
was that “it is of vital interest for a small country like Denmark that there is a rule-bound 
international world order, where regulation of states’ behavior is sought through international 
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agreements and institutions…the price for letting Russia break international law and order 
without consequences will, in the long term, be higher and contribute to greater insecurity”.249  
Regarding the energy sector, the American sanctions cover both the Russian gas and oil 
sectors; the EU sanctions do not apply to the gas sector because of EU dependence on Russian 
gas.250 This means that expansion of the Nord Stream gas pipeline project from northwestern 
Russia to northern Germany could continue unhindered. Denmark had approved the permit for 
Nord Stream in October 2009. Political support for the pipeline in Denmark at the time had 
already been established, in spite of surrounding concerns over the security effects of the 
pipeline. Therefore, there was no need to exercise the right of rejection, on any basis, that 
Denmark did have available to it due to the pipeline’s passage through Danish territorial waters. 
The success of Nord Stream led to the planning, beginning in 2012, of a companion line called 
Nord Stream 2. The two pipelines (each is actually comprised of two smaller pipelines, so in 
reality there are four) would have the combined capacity to transport 110 billion cubic meters 
(bcm) of gas annually. This time, however, the pipeline project lacked the support in Denmark 
that the original had enjoyed. 
Poland, the Baltic countries, and Ukraine feared Nord Stream because it would, in their 
eyes and in their experiences, make Western Europe more dependent upon Russian gas and less 
willing to listen to their real concerns about Russia, many of which often had to do with their 
own dependence upon Russian gas. These fears were only compounded by the plans for Nord 
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Stream 2. The stakeholders in Nord Stream 2 reject these fears of dependency. On their website, 
they cite a consumption forecast that sees gas production in the EU dropping by 50% by 2038.251 
An increase in imports of Russian gas, they argue, will not increase Europe’s dependency on 
Russia, because gas companies will continue to compete in the free market and purchase where 
they find the best deal.252 In November 2019, the Director on EU-Russia Cooperation Issues 
from the Russian Energy Agency spoke in Copenhagen at the annual Ruslandskonference 
(Russia Conference) that is held there by the Danish-Russian Union, supported by the Danish 
government. The director, Dr. Teodor Shtilkind, reiterated this argument. He also had a slide in 
his presentation dedicated to discussing gas transit through Ukraine. 
One of the primary fears, shared by both Ukraine and its partners, is that completion of 
Nord Stream 2 will allow Russia to fully cut Ukraine out of its gas transit network. This would 
be serious for Ukraine, which earns $3 billion annually from transiting Russian gas.253 Dr. 
Shtilkind, sharing the Russian argument against these fears, cited export figures showing that the 
amount of gas sent through Ukraine in 2018 “significantly exceeded the total capacity of NS2 
and that of the 2nd line of the Turkish Stream project”.254 This is true; NS2 has a capacity of 55 
bcm., while the second line of TurkStream has a capacity of 15.75 bcm. The combined total of 
approximately 70 bcm. does not cover the 87 bcm. exported through Ukraine in 2018. However, 
both lines of TurkStream (the first runs to Turkey, the second to southeastern Europe) have a 
combined capacity of 31.5 bcm., and Nord Stream plus Nord Stream 2 have a combined capacity 
of 110 bcm.255 This number does exceed the Ukrainian export figures.  
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In 2019, 58.5 bcm. of gas was sent through Nord Stream, so even the increased capacity 
of Nord Stream 2 would not allow for a hypothetical full redirection of Ukrainian gas transit 
through the Baltic pipelines.256 But, between Nord Stream and TurkStream Gazprom still has the 
capacity to, at the very least, decrease gas transit through Ukraine, and thereby decrease gas 
revenue to Ukraine. Poland also stands to lose gas transit revenue from the completion of Nord 
Stream 2 – Eser et. al. estimate that Poland will lose 23% of its gas transit revenue with Nord 
Stream 2, while Ukraine will lose 13%.257 They also conclude that “a short-term disruption of 
Ukrainian gas flows has only minor operational and financial impacts on the European gas 
system”; this does not, however, speak to the impacts on Ukraine.258 This could lay the 
conditions for greater effectiveness of Russian influence in Ukraine, such as, for example, 
pressuring the Ukrainian government into pro-Russia policies.  
The EU is projected to increase gas imports by around 50 bcm. in the coming decade, 
according to Dr. Shtilkind. This amount would be covered by Nord Stream 2’s added capacity. 
However, the argument that Russia does not stand to gain influence over Western Europe with 
these increased deliveries can be countered. Russia does depend on income from Western 
European energy consumption, giving it less of an incentive to disrupt gas flows to that market. 
However, if Europe’s need for Russian gas is so dire, this arguably gives Russia the advantage in 
the relationship. If a political crisis were to strike between Russia and the EU during the cold 
winter months, a contraction of gas supplies to Europe would be much more damaging in the 
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short term than a contraction of income to Gazprom, especially as it is also actively seeking to 
expand its gas delivery capacities to China.259 
It is these types of concerns that the young Danish MP Mette Frederiksen (Social 
Democrats/Socialdemokratiet, S) likely had in mind when she, in 2017, asked Lars Løkke 
Rasmussen to take a broader perspective on Nord Stream 2. “Everyone in this room knows that 
energy policy is about more than just energy, and one could say that in the current situation with 
Russia’s aggressive behavior…it would of course be problematic to frame a question of Russian 
gas and delivery of Russian gas solely as energy policy,” she said, addressing the parliament. 
“The question is therefore of whether Denmark is going into this with open eyes…when we had 
this discussion many years ago, when the prime minister also had a responsibility, [the 
government] chose to use the perspective that this was a purely commercial affair.”260 It is 
unclear whether she meant Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s government, which was in charge when 
Nord Stream first began to gain traction, or whether she meant Lars Løkke Rasmussen’s earlier 
government, which approved the construction permits for Nord Stream; either way, her words 
apply. Nord Stream 2 was met with significantly more opposition in Denmark than its 
predecessor, because of the previously mentioned concerns. The debate over whether these 
concerns are legitimate or not is realistically a political debate with no definitive answer; 
however, these were the concerns from the Danish perspective. 
The problem was unfortunately one that Mette Frederiksen would herself inherit after 
being elected the country’s youngest-ever prime minister in June 2019. The original Nord Stream 
pipelines ran through the Danish territorial waters surrounding Bornholm. According to 
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international law, a country can reject such a pipeline on any basis, political or security or 
environmental, if the plans run through territorial waters. If the plans run through a country’s 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ), however, they may only be rejected on the basis that they pose 
an environmental hazard. Gazprom, very cognizant of this fact, planned for Nord Stream 2 to run 
through Denmark’s EEZ. Originally it was planned for it to follow the route of Nord Stream, and 
run alongside Bornholm through Danish territorial waters, but Gazprom had a backup plan when 
the first was rejected by the Danes. This took the decision out of Danish hands; Putin recognized 
this when he said in early October 2019, “Whether Denmark is able to display independence and 
sovereignty depends on the country itself. If it is not prepared to do so, then there are other 
routes.”261 The Nord Stream 2 pipelines are planned and built in accordance with the necessary 
environmental regulations in the Baltic Sea. This meant that Denmark’s hand was essentially 
forced into approving the pipeline, the final approval for which Gazprom had been waiting, in 
October 2019.  
The governing parties in Denmark were unhappy. “It is not our conviction that we think 
the EU should have more gas from Russia. We would rather have avoided this case. In this 
concrete case, however, Denmark was obligated under international law to grant permission. It is 
a purely administrative decision,” energy minister Dan Jørgensen (S) said of the approval.262 
Martin Lidegaard (Radical Left/Radikale Venstre, RV) called it an “unavoidable, but unhappy 
decision”, while the Unity List (Enhedslisten, EL) wrote that “Russia should not be rewarded for 
its aggressive behavior around the world”.263 However, while a majority of the Danish 
parliament opposed Nord Stream 2 as a political issue, not everyone did. The Danish People’s 
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Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF) had expressed its support for the pipeline in 2018 and still 
considered the pipeline to be a purely commercial affair in 2019.264 Whether the pipeline does 
turn out to be a purely commercial affair or a geopolitical tinderbox remains to be seen. It was 
less than reassuring that, only two weeks after Nord Stream 2’s final permit, Gazprom tried to 
negotiate its new gas deal with Ukraine (the existing one would expire at the end of 2019) to 
only a one-year deal, indicating a real effort to cut Ukraine out of gas transit as soon as Nord 
Stream 2 was fully operational.265 However, in a more hopeful development, Russia and Ukraine 
were able to secure a longer five-year deal the following month. 
The US primarily opposes the completion of Nord Stream 2 because its completion, and 
Russia’s ability to increase its gas sales to Europe, will make it more difficult for the US to 
expand its own energy agenda in Western Europe. There are also arguable political reasons for 
the US opposition, but these are not uniform and are complicated by the relationship between 
Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin. The US is seeking to increase its exports of liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) to Western Europe; the major issue is that there are prohibitive costs associated with 
importing LNG. LNG requires specific infrastructural capacities for an importer to be able to 
receive, store, and further distribute the gas. Eser et al. argue that the European pipeline market is 
already sufficient to accommodate both the American LNG and Russian Nord Stream 2 import 
strategies, with the qualifier that investments need to be made to upgrade the existing 
infrastructure to ensure the necessary bidirectionality.266 The completion of Nord Stream 2 is 
nonetheless a threat to this American corporate-political business interest.  
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Towards that end, in December 2019 the US joined Danish and other European 
politicians in linking energy security and gas supplies to defense policy. The American Congress 
voted to pass a new defense bill which named Nord Stream 2 “a tool of coercion” and sanctioned 
the pipeline, causing Allseas, a Swiss-Dutch company operating in Danish waters, to suspend its 
construction activities on the pipeline.267 However, this would only delay, rather than totally 
prevent, the completion of Nord Stream 2. At the time of the sanctions, Russia’s energy minister 
commented that the completion date would only be pushed back from late 2019 to instead the 
end of 2020.268 In addition to Russian anger, the US sanctions also prompted a strong response 
from the EU, which hit back against “the imposition of sanctions against EU companies 
conducting legitimate business”.269  
As late as March 2020, US Senator Ted Cruz was in talks with Ukraine’s national gas 
and oil company, Naftogaz, about ways to halt the progress of the pipeline.270 Gazprom still has 
several ships available to it that it could make use of to pick up the slack where Allseas was 
forced to leave off; however, since the pipe-laying that remains is in Danish waters, and 
Denmark has strict laws on the types of ships that may operate in its waters due to the high 
number of unexploded bombs on the sea of the Baltic left over from World War II (somewhat 
ironically, these are Soviet bombs), there have been delays on approving one or both of 
Gazprom’s ships’ ability to continue work in the area. Nord Stream 2 will, by all estimates, be 
finished one way or another in 2020 – the primary questions by now simply concern when and 
by whom. 
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Cultural Relations 
 
 Danish Russia expert Flemming Splidsboel Hansen conducted two companion studies, 
the first in 2010 and the second in 2018, analyzing the tone of Danish media towards Russia 
during the 2000s and 2010s respectively. He found that the top five newspapers in Denmark 
(Berlingske, Politiken, BT, Jyllands-Posten, and Ekstrabladet) all had negative outlooks towards 
Russia in the 2000s, shaped by Putin’s aggressive centralization of domestic power and 
disproportionate use of force in Chechnya; in the 2010s, this trend grew and shifted towards a 
narrative in which Denmark and its allies need to protect themselves militarily against Russia’s 
aggressive violation of borders.271 Image construction by the media of a given topic can both 
influence and be influenced by popular opinion, and in turn these images bleed into pop culture 
media. 
Literature 
Both during the Cold War and following its resolution, Western media has commonly 
portrayed Russians, or more generally Eastern Europeans, as villainous characters; Russia often 
serves as a mysterious and sometimes nefarious location, rife with former KGB spooks. Despite 
the legacy of the Cold War fading somewhat in Western media, Russia remains a source of 
inspiration for political thrillers and mystery novels. Denmark is no exception. One of the 
country’s most popular writers is Leif Davidsen. Davidsen worked as the Moscow correspondent 
for DR (Danmarks Radio) for much of the 1980s and was living in Soviet Russia during the 
collapse of communism. These were experiences that he brought into his writing when he began 
writing fiction during his time as a correspondent.  
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In 1988 he published The Russian Singer, the first of what went on to be known as his 
Russian trilogy. A Danish diplomat in Moscow is pulled into the political chaos surrounding the 
impending fall of the Soviet Union when one of his embassy coworkers is found dead in an 
apartment with a girl from the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic. This was likely one of the 
earliest and best-known novels that would inform the average Danish thriller-reader of what was 
going on across the Baltic; it is therefore worth looking further into what kinds of details this 
average Danish reader would be learning, especially because the book was adapted to a film 
version in 1993. Davidsen does write sympathetically towards the Russian people – it would be 
disingenuous to cast him as a writer who vilifies Russians for the sake of a good story. Arguably, 
his sympathy is what causes him to write honestly about what he perceived to be Soviet 
government wrongs and societal chaos while he was living in Moscow. He did, however, state in 
an interview that when he was unsure of where a character’s ultimate loyalties lay, “That’s fine, 
because that’s how it always is in Russia. Double betrayal lies deep in the Russians and in the 
power over there.”272 
The protagonist Jack Andersen falls in love with Lilli, the sister of the murdered Estonian 
girl, and his investigation of the murder, combined with their relationship, endangers Lilli, a 
Soviet citizen, with the government. The Russians that he meets all have their own stories of 
hardship and experiences with corruption, and they fear the existential failure of their country. At 
one point, Jack joins his embassy colleagues in a meeting with the Scandinavia desk at the 
Russian foreign ministry; the meeting turns into a lecture by Kamarassov, a Soviet official, about 
NATO’s aggressive intentions, Denmark’s need to use its influence and stop preparations for 
war, and the island of Bornholm’s exploitation as a springboard for Western aggression against 
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the socialist countries. Jack remarks, “It was hard to take it all seriously when you were seeing 
your small country described as an armed military giant that only wishes to wage war against the 
socialist countries. If it wasn’t tragic because Kamarassov meant it, it would have been 
comical.”273 This echoes a real-life interaction, mentioned in the earlier history and background 
chapter, in which Danish diplomat Alex Mørch met with Soviet Marshal Kirill Moskalenko and 
noted after the fact that Moskalenko’s conviction that the West was planning an attack on the 
Soviet Union revealed him to be depressingly misinformed.274 Andersen also bears witness to the 
rise of Pamyat (“Память” in Russian Cyrillic; “Memory” in English), a neo-Nazi ultranationalist 
organization in Russia dedicated to the preservation of Russian culture and national-patriotic 
Orthodox Christianity.  
The Russian Singer, which is the only one of Davidsen’s Russia novels currently 
published in English, was followed up by The Last Spy in 1991 and The Innocent Russian in 
1993. The Last Spy won the 1991 Golden Laurel (De Gyldne Laurbær) book prize, which is 
voted on annually by Danish bookshops and is usually won by a bestseller. The book tells the 
story of PET (the police intelligence service) head Jette Jansen’s pursuit of a spy in the Danish 
intelligence services and cooperation with a KGB agent to find the spy.275 The Innocent Russian 
follows Danish-Armenian Felix Terjosan Jensen to southern Russia, where he has a mysterious 
debt to Saddam Hussein to pay; this takes him to an international hotel, where politicians and 
mobsters from around the world gather to participate in a black market of former Soviet 
goods.276 After this book, Davidsen took a break from writing about Russia for the next decade. 
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Another Danish author, Klaus Enghvidt Olsen, also drew on his experiences as a Dane in 
a chaotic period of Russian history, this time 1990s Moscow. He was the director of the new 
Russian branch of the Danish chewing gum company Dandy (now known as Dansk 
Tyggegummi Fabrik, or Danish Chewing Gum Factory), which enjoyed great success in the new 
Russian market – chewing gum was widely discouraged in the Soviet Union – and competed 
with the American brand Wrigley.277 Twenty years later, Enghvidt Olsen released a collection of 
short stories called Russia After The Wall’s Collapse, which he said was based in his “intimate 
knowledge of the country’s development, history and culture – and not least of the country’s 
residents, for better or for worse”; he had also traveled around the former Soviet Union in the 
late ‘80s.278 Enghvidt Olsen’s short story collection takes more of a slice-of-life approach than 
Davidsen’s, giving any Danish readers today insight into how their countryman experienced a 
tumultuous decade in the East. 
Leif Davidsen returned to writing about Russia in 2006, when he released The Unknown 
Wife. He described it on the back cover as “a story of disappearance from the new Russia”, in 
which a Danish man and his Russian wife take a river cruise through Russia, until her 
disappearance in “Putin’s post-communist Russia” causes him to unearth a hidden truth about 
her identity.279 Putin became a character, albeit either anonymously or with a different name, in 
Davidsen’s Russia novels going forward. In 2013, he released The Accidental Death of the 
Patriarch. This novel brought the intrigue of Danish-Russian energy relations home to Danish 
readers. The half-Danish, half-Russian Adam Lassen learns that his twin brother Gabriel, who 
has been living in Moscow and working for the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, 
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Tikhon, has just been found murdered in Moscow. Adam begins to investigate the case on his 
own with the help of Masha Kudrina, a Moscow police officer whose brother Sasha Karbanov is 
a powerful Russian businessman with close political ties to the Kremlin.  
As the truth unravels, Adam learns that Gabriel and his girlfriend’s father had worked 
together on researching energy issues. His girlfriend’s father was murdered after he discovered 
that the original Nord Stream pipeline had been poorly built and would eventually leak gas out 
into the Baltic Sea; the release of this information would ruin Danish-Russian relations and sink 
Sasha Karbanov’s hopes of using Denmark and Danish companies to advance Russian pursuit of 
Arctic oil and an oil monopoly in Europe. Gabriel is murdered after he brings this information to 
Patriarch Tikhon, which also results in the murder of the Patriarch by the FSB. In addition to 
wanting to publicize the Nord Stream leak, Tikhon also advocated for the separation of the 
Russian Orthodox Church from the Kremlin.280 
The president in The Accidental Death of the Patriarch who orders his security services 
to murder citizens and religious figures alike is clearly supposed to represent Vladimir Putin. In 
an interview, Davidsen said that Patriarch Tikhon was intended to represent Patriarch Alexy II, 
who died in December 2008. Davidsen cited rumors he had heard in Moscow that Alexy was 
murdered by the Kremlin for his refusal to bless Putin’s war on Georgia several months earlier as 
inspiration for the starting point of his novel.281 Although Georgia does not itself feature in this 
novel, Davidsen’s characters do often eat at Georgian restaurants. One interesting change in the 
broader Danish-Russian relationship that can be tracked through Davidsen’s books is the shift 
away from Russian-based exonyms in the Danish language. While many Western languages 
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refer to the country as “Georgia”, Slavic-based languages and languages of countries that 
historically were in contact with the Russian Empire often use a variant of “Gruzia”, the Russian 
name for the country. Since the Rose Revolution, the Georgian government has been actively 
trying to influence countries away from using the Russia-influenced terms for its countries and 
its people and instead use the Western exonym. In Davidsen’s earlier books, the adjective 
“gruziske” is used; in his later books, he uses “georgiske”, and the Danish word used today for 
Georgia is “Georgien”. Although it is difficult to locate a source for when this shift took place, 
Denmark obviously made a conscious choice to reject Russian influence in the etymology of 
some of its neighbors; similarly, Danish government websites have transitioned to using the 
Ukrainian “Kyiv” to refer to the country’s capital city, rather than the Russian spelling “Kiev”. 
Davidsen’s most recent Russia novel, The Devil in the Hole, was released in 2016 and 
similarly draws inspiration from recent events surrounding Russia and fears in Denmark 
stemming from those events. It opens in the winter of 2014, as the ousted Ukrainian president 
Viktor Yanukovych (unnamed in the book, but unmistakably described) is fleeing his residence 
outside of Kyiv after the Euromaidan protests. One of his bodyguards, a half-Danish Russian 
nationalist named Tor, is shot in the leg during the evacuation and forced to return to civilian 
life. Tor’s father is a former Danish intelligence agent who served undercover in the Soviet 
Union, fell in love with a Russian woman, and defected from his country to remain in Russia 
with her, in the process abandoning his wife and daughter Laila in Denmark. Now an adult, Laila 
learns that her father has intelligence he is trying to sneak out of Russia, prompting her departure 
to go see him in Russia and validate his information. As it turns out, the Russian president, also 
intended to represent Putin, is planning on invading the Baltic countries. He wants to send 
Russians into the Baltics to pose as members of the Russian minorities there who can then claim 
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discrimination and raise unrest, thereby giving the Russian state an excuse to invade and defend 
its people abroad. Laila’s father asks her to take this information back West so that the assault 
can be stopped and World War III can be avoided.282 
This is also the first time Laila has heard of the existence of her half-brother Tor, and 
their new relationship is a focal point of the book. They have some similarities in their 
background: Tor worked for the Russian security services until his injury disqualified him from 
service; Laila grew up to be a patriotic Dane who served in the Danish military and deployed to 
Iraq, a model citizen of Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s ideal of Denmark as a NATO team player. 
Otherwise, the two represent a clash of cultural norms between their countries. Tor works as a 
Russian Internet troll, using his Danish language skills learned from his father to work in the 
Danish social media sphere and attempt to influence Danish opinions in the direction of pro-
Russia positions. To Laila’s shock, he expresses un-Western values and often makes 
homophobic or racist comments, especially directing racial slurs towards people from the 
Caucasus region. Although they quickly become close, these cultural differences strain and alter 
their new relationship. There is also an incident in the book which, utilizing rather heavy-handed 
imagery, sees Laila save Tor from a bear attack on a hunting trip; the bear is a frequently used 
symbol of Russia, and the scene does little to advance the plot of the book. 
In 2018, a former political employee in the government and later political commentator 
for Politiken, Peter Mogensen, also decided to release a Russia-centric thriller. His novel, In the 
Bear’s Claws, manages to cover essentially all of the major points of the Danish-Russian 
relationship since the 1990s. The protagonist, Henrik Foss, is the foreign affairs spokesman for 
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the center-right political party Venstre (Left). A veteran of the Danish military’s Jægerkorps 
special forces, he lost his eye in battle with Russian militia forces in Bosnia in the 1990s. 
Denmark is overtaking chairmanship of the UN Security Council, just as Chechen independence 
is being brought before the Council for a vote. The Russian president Sorokin (again, clearly 
representative of Putin) attempts to pressure Denmark into voting no, and the Danish government 
fears that Sorokin’s pressure will entail a shutdown of Russian gas to Denmark and to Europe. 
Foss and Venstre continue to openly advocate for Chechen independence.283  
There is a crisis of confidence among NATO members in Eastern Europe, who see that 
the US will put its own concerns above its Article 5 collective defense obligations as a NATO 
member; Donald Trump also makes a thinly-veiled appearance in references to an insane, 
Russian-installed American president known for using Twitter. Real-life Danish politician Marie 
Krarup also makes an anonymous appearance in the book, as a nameless female politician from 
the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti) who is friendly towards the Russian cause; the 
other characters do not suspect her of espionage, but remark that someone else like her could do 
it. A Russian-Chechen henchman, Kurtznes, is dispatched to Denmark to terrorize Foss by 
kidnapping his ex-wife and children and pressure him into revoking his support for Chechen 
independence; also pulled into the drama is a recently-graduated Ph.D. student who wrote her 
dissertation on Chechnya and later reveals herself to be a half-Chechen, half-Slovak 
granddaughter of Alexander Dubček, the Czechoslovak hero who led the Prague Spring against 
Soviet control in 1968. Kurtznes is eventually forced into making a dramatic escape into the 
Baltic Sea by submarine, which evokes memories among the characters of the submarine disaster 
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(in real life, this was the Kursk disaster of 2000) in which the president allowed hundreds of 
Russians to die rather than accept Western help.  
So far, the books described here draw heavily (if at times over-exaggeratedly) from 
contemporary Russian politics as inspiration for dramatic and suspenseful plots; however, this is 
not to say that historical Russian politics do not have a place in the present Danish literary space. 
Martin Andersen Nexø, a well-known Danish writer during the twentieth century, lived a 
lifetime of controversial events and remains a controversial figure today. Born in 1869, he grew 
up on the Danish island of Bornholm, which would later be bombed heavily during the Red 
Army’s liberation campaign at the end of World War II, and as a middle-aged man became a 
member of the Danish Communist Party (DKP). Nexø became known for the inextricable 
linkage of politics and art in his writing, which attained significant popularity in the communist 
countries of Eastern Europe. He traveled widely in the Soviet Union, for him the epitome of the 
socialist dream, and was present for one of Josef Stalin’s show trials of the political opposition in 
the late 1930s; Nexø said the trial (which resulted in the execution of thirteen political 
opponents) was carried out “humanely” and with “absolute freedom of speech”.284 When the 
Soviet Union invaded Finland and occupied the Baltic countries several years later, he 
congratulated the Baltic peoples on their “new freedom” and praised the “peaceful cleansing 
action”.285  
Some sectors of Danish political thinking regard Martin Andersen Nexø as possessing 
“naivety and partial political blindness”.286 However, the so-called proletarian writer is today 
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venerated by Danish leftists, who commend his antifascist views (despite his silence when Nazi 
Germany occupied Denmark) and advocacy for the proletarian, “which is to say, man himself”, 
and regard him as a lens for understanding contemporary political literature.287 Leftist workers’ 
movements in Denmark celebrated his 150th birthday in 2019 with a large conference in his 
name.288 One of his most famous works, Pelle Erobreren (Pelle the Conqueror), was turned into 
a film in 1987 that starred Max von Sydow and went on to win an Oscar.  
Film and television 
The Danish film and TV industries have not had a significant focus on Russia in recent 
years, choosing to focus more on the Middle East as a regional setting in light of the War on 
Terror and Denmark’s lengthy military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, there are 
still some releases that are worth mentioning in this context. Danish politics in the 2000s saw a 
meaningful revival of the memory of Denmark’s defeat to Germany in 1864 and subsequent loss 
of territory. Various politicians, most notably Anders Fogh Rasmussen during his time as prime 
minister, invoked this year as a reminder of what happened to Denmark when it isolated itself. In 
2014, Denmark’s major public broadcasting service DR produced 1864, the most expensive 
Danish TV series to date.  
1864 brought to life the horrors of the Second Schleswig War and the pain of losing 
Schleswig-Holstein. It also told a parallel story of a Danish family in present-day Denmark, 
living with the loss of a son who died serving overseas; it is implied that he was deployed to the 
NATO mission in Afghanistan. This was an important series and important to make note of here, 
because it brought to the forefront of Danish pop culture twin narratives of what happened when 
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Denmark did not have allies to protect it from aggressive neighbors and of what individual 
sacrifices these international alliances would entail to keep the country safe. 
Also worth mentioning is a Norwegian TV series that began airing in 2015. Its 
Norwegian title, Okkupert, is directly translated to Occupied in its English-language release. 
Okkupert tells the story of a world in which the US has left NATO, and Norway’s renewable 
energy industry has grown so much that it decides to fully cease production of oil and gas. The 
EU, currently undergoing an energy crisis, joins forces with Russia to pressure Norway into 
restoring gas and oil deliveries to Europe; this pressure takes the form of a de facto political coup 
by the Russian government within the Norwegian government and a takeover of Norwegian 
energy infrastructure by Russian forces. Investigative journalists are murdered, and Chechen 
terrorism comes to Oslo. The series was met with criticism by the Russian embassy in Norway, 
which said, “It is really shameful that the writers, in the same year that we are celebrating the 
70th anniversary of the victory in World War II, appear to have forgotten the Red Army’s heroic 
contribution to the liberation of northern Norway from the Nazi occupiers.”289  
The series was sold to DR and aired in Denmark under the name Den russiske 
ambassadør, which translates directly to The Russian Ambassador and is quite different from the 
Norwegian or English titles. In the wake of the 2014 Ukraine crisis and the resultant international 
condemnation of Russia, this title change of a popular and controversial TV series is a relatively 
small but nonetheless significant indicator of how Russia was viewed in the Danish 
entertainment industry at the time. It also serves to, at least at the outset, effectively put greater 
weight on Russia as the aggressor in the narrative, as opposed to the more generalized Occupied 
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title which is a less-specific reflection of the EU-orchestrated, EU-sanctioned, and Russia-
executed occupation that this fictional Norway goes through. 
While a fictionalized Russia has not had a large presence on Danish TV screens, the real-
life Russia has, markedly more so after the 2014 Ukraine crisis. DR’s popular Horisont 
(Horizon) program, akin to the PBS program Frontline, did a feature in 2018 on the resurrection 
of Cold War geopolitical dynamics, called “Enemies again?” It opens with an unsettling montage 
of Vladimir Putin speaking about Western provocations, cut with footage of Lars Løkke 
Rasmussen talking up NATO commitments and Russian aggression. The rest of the 24-minute 
feature is split between following the 200 Danish soldiers stationed in Estonia as a NATO 
tripwire, and Grigoriy, a former Russian soldier who lives in the forest north of St. Petersburg 
and trains children in Yunarmiya, the Russian defense ministry’s youth organization.  
Though the two subjects appear rather polar, their words actually show more common 
ground than their purposes indicate. “Some say that we have to [be here]. There is a larger 
political game. In my head, the politics don’t factor in so much,” a Danish army private with the 
nickname Beef tells Horisont. “The threat is so small. I can’t see [a Russian invasion] being the 
scenario. If that happened, then we’re really fucked, regardless of however the hell we spin it.”290 
Similarly, Grigoriy expresses defensive views of his role: “The most important thing is that they 
don’t invade us. What do we want with Europe? What’s so special about Europe? Expansion of 
our territory? We have enough to do to secure what we have. Do we have plans to invade another 
country? No.”291 However, Horisont still takes the opportunity, as it did in the feature’s 
introduction, to do some pointed narrative-framing when depicting soldiers on both sides. At one 
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point, Grigoriy and his friends drink and sing a song toasting the memory of Stalin; later, a truck 
full of Danish soldiers cheerfully sings a song by Cæsar, a well-known Danish protest singer of 
the 1960s. 
In August 2000, a Russian submarine called the Kursk exploded underwater while 
conducting a naval exercise in the Barents Sea and sank; most of the 118-man crew were killed 
immediately. The disaster occurred eight months into Putin’s first term as president; when 
Russian rescue efforts located the submarine, they were not adequately equipped to actually 
rescue any of the crew, 23 of whom survived the initial disaster but died waiting to be rescued. 
The British and Norwegian governments offered rescue help, which was refused by Putin until a 
week after the initial accident had occurred. Putin and the Russian navy came under fire for 
failing to respond adequately to the disaster.292  
Production began in August 2015, exactly fifteen years later, for a film dramatization of 
the event. Danish director Martin Zandvliet was originally put in charge of the project, but 
control of the project eventually passed to the hands of Thomas Vinterberg, another Danish 
director. Vinterberg chose not to include Putin as a character in the film – The Hollywood 
Reporter published claims that the production company did so out of fear of retributive Russian 
hacking.293 Vinterberg denied this report, calling it “all bullshit” and explaining, “I made the 
decision because I think this movie was, first and foremost, about humanity. And I did not want 
this movie to reduce itself to become a finger-pointing movie against specific persons…Also, we 
do not know how or how much Putin was involved with this.”294 This apolitical approach was a 
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somewhat unique one in an entertainment climate that arguably otherwise often politicizes the 
onscreen depictions of certain events or figures. 
Sports 
Sports in the 2010s provided a venue for a clash of cultural norms between Denmark and 
Russia. Russia hosted the 2014 Winter Olympics in its Black Sea city of Sochi. In 2013, Russia 
passed a law criminalizing the portrayal to minors of non-traditional sexual orientations or 
relations, by which was meant non-heterosexual relationships. Denmark, which has one of the 
world’s most extensive and progressive track record on protection of LGBTQ rights, openly 
criticized the passage of this law. Over ten thousand Danes in Copenhagen protested the law in 
front of Christiansborg, which houses the Danish parliament, and then in front of the Russian 
embassy.295 There was concern among Danish politicians that homosexual participants and 
attendees at the Sochi Olympics would be subject to detainment or harassment by Russian 
authorities, but culture minister Marianne Jelved expressed her confidence in the International 
Olympic Committee’s ability to protect its athletes, as well as its agreement with Russia that the 
law would not affect Olympic participants.296 
Denmark has also been critical of the state-sponsored doping by Russian athletes to 
enhance their performance in international competitions. The Danish culture ministry expressed 
its disappointment that Russia had not been barred from the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio de 
Janeiro, saying, “It is the Danish government’s opinion that rules are there to be followed – and 
regardless of if one is an athlete, support personnel, a country, or a sporting organization, one 
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must uphold the anti-doping rules.”297 Russia was later banned in December 2019 from all major 
sporting events for the next four years by the World Anti-Doping Agency, a decision that the 
Danish government welcomed and supported, as it “followed the line Denmark has had on the 
topic of doping for many years”.298 
 Russia hosted the 2018 FIFA World Cup, for which Denmark qualified. Denmark’s 
squad, captained by Simon Kjær and featuring stars such as Kasper Schmeichel and Christian 
Eriksen, progressed past the group stages of the tournament and made it to the knockout round of 
sixteen. Here, however, Denmark was eliminated by eventual runners-up Croatia in a penalty 
shootout. Russia’s hosting of the World Cup was racked by controversies, notably including the 
March 2018 poisoning of Sergei Skripal, a former Russian intelligence officer who worked with 
UK intelligence as a double agent, and his daughter Yulia in Salisbury, England. The British 
government accused Russia of being behind the attack and announced that it would not send any 
diplomatic representatives, as is otherwise customary, to the World Cup.299  
Iceland and Sweden joined the diplomatic boycott, although Sweden eventually lifted the 
boycott after its squad qualified for the knockout round.300 Denmark did not entertain a 
diplomatic boycott of the tournament and was represented by minister of culture Mette Bock and 
ambassador to Russia Thomas Winkler.301 Players and fans alike from other countries were 
penalized during the World Cup for political celebrations or expressions during matches, some of 
which criticized Russian actions in Ukraine; however, the only penalty Danish fans received was 
 
297 Haarder 2016. 
298 Mogensen 2020. 
299 BBC 2018. 
300 O’Connor 2018; The Local 2018. 
301 Bock 2018. 
118 
 
 
 
for throwing beer on Australian fans and displaying a banner that read “Big Boobs” in Danish 
during the Denmark-Australia group stage match on 26 June. 
Cross-cultural cooperation 
In May 2008, the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
was established as an agency of the Russian foreign ministry.302 It was then reorganized by 
President Medvedev in September 2008, a month after the invasion of Georgia, into the Federal 
Agency for the CIS, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation – 
this agency is most commonly known as Rossotrudnichestvo. The purpose of this organization is 
to maintain Russian cultural influence and soft power in the regions of operation. It has an office 
in the heart of Copenhagen, the Russian Center for Knowledge and Culture, which also supports 
Russian cultural institutions in the rest of Scandinavia. Per the Center’s website, its mission is 
“to profile Russia as a country, promoting the Russian language and culture in Denmark by 
conducting various social and cultural activities that give participants a look into Russia’s 
modern life, art, music, literature, theater, film, and knowledge”.303 In pursuit of this mission, it 
hosts regular film screenings, concerts, and artistic exhibitions that either highlight a Russian 
contribution to the field or a Russian-Danish collaboration.  
In May 2019 the Center screened the 2007 Russian film Rusalka (Mermaid in English, 
Havfrue in Danish).304 Rusalka is a loose modern-day adaptation of The Little Mermaid, one of 
the best-known stories by the prolific Danish writer Hans Christian Andersen. In each story, a 
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young woman falls in love with a man who loves another. She can either choose to put his 
happiness first and allow him to be with his beloved, but at the cost of her own life or happiness, 
depending on the story; or, she can prioritize her own happiness, but at the cost of his life or 
freedom, again depending on the story. In The Little Mermaid, the mermaid kills herself rather 
than disrupt or end the life of the prince she loves. In Rusalka, the protagonist Alice is killed, 
freeing her beloved Sasha to be with Rita, the woman he really loves. Alice has a supernatural 
ability that causes the fulfillment of her desires; her death, therefore, can be interpreted as her 
final wish to allow Sasha to be freed of her influence and to choose Rita. Though the method of 
exercising agency differs between the two stories’ protagonists, the intent and outcome are the 
same. The widespread popularity of each story in its respective country and adoption of its 
themes by the other country speaks to a cultural common ground between Denmark and Russia 
that is more frequently lost among the noise of high-level politics and confrontations. 
Conclusion and Predictions 
 
 Russian-American relations and Russian-EU relations remain the defining frames for 
many international issues and conflicts today. Rather than discount the smaller and often 
undervalued bilateral relationships contained within these larger relationships, these frames 
actually heighten the emphasis that should be placed on these smaller bilateral relationships. 
Denmark, despite its small size, has a very strong case for why it should be accorded more 
attention and strategic value than it is currently. Its unique positioning, central to both major 
avenues of Russia’s energy expansion into both Western Europe and the Arctic, means that the 
US, Russia, and any other major actors interested in the development of both European energy 
security and Western-Russian relations need to start counting Denmark in.  
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Outside of rhetoric, there is no single strategy available for achieving energy security in 
both Western and Eastern-Central Europe.305 Denmark occupies the unique space bridging the 
energy policies of both regions, and is directly involved in the transit and exploration processes 
of Russian energy initiatives in both the Baltic and Arctic regions. In addition to Denmark’s 
staunch support of and participation in NATO, this is the primary reason why it needs to be 
accorded greater influence and importance by the US, Russia, and other major partners; this is 
why in-depth understanding of the Danish-Russian relationship matters. Understanding how the 
relationship we see today came to be is crucial to understanding where it can go, and where its 
potential for both peaceful cooperation and confrontational flare-ups lie. 
 In this thesis, I work to establish a map of what fluctuations we have seen take place 
between Denmark and Russia over the past thirty years, and which events, trends, and people 
prompted these fluctuations. We can use this information when looking ahead at how the 
relationship might look in the future. At the time of writing, the world is a few months into the 
coronavirus pandemic crisis, which complicates to a degree attempts at forecasting international 
relations. Danish prime minister Mette Frederiksen has been tasked with responding to a crisis 
that has no real precedent in living memory, and her initial measures designed to address the 
crisis have been well-received in the country, both politically and publicly. However, significant 
steps taken by the government in mid-April 2020, coupled with the long-term uncertainty of the 
crisis itself, will have strongly catalyzing effects on Danish politics that, in the future, will 
inevitably affect Danish-Russian relations as well.  
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If Frederiksen and her government continue to receive approval for their measures to 
combat the virus, she will likely be able to build upon this period for future reelection. As a 
result of high approval levels, she could experience a boost in self-confidence and assertiveness, 
and potentially establish a broader political consensus and base of support. In this scenario, we 
are likely to see a stronger Danish government and state, at least in the short term. Combine this 
with Frederiksen’s record of opposition to Nord Stream 2, and Putin may find himself looking 
across the Baltic at a leader more difficult to push over than either his friend Lars Løkke 
Rasmussen or the more distant Helle Thorning-Schmidt. 
 If Frederiksen is unable to emerge from the coronavirus crisis in a good light, she may 
fail in a reelection campaign; there are different consequences to this, depending on the political 
orientation and eventual coalition of her successor. Should a centrist prime minister, whether 
center-right or center-left, replace Frederiksen, then we can reasonably expect to see a 
continuation of the Danish government’s opposition to Russia’s expansion of its energy sector; 
though Danish-Russian energy cooperation began and gained traction under Lars Løkke 
Rasmussen, a center-right prime minister, he also demonstrated an ability and willingness to 
change his position on the topic when presented with it again a decade later.  
However, there is already evidence accumulating from around the world, and particularly 
in Europe, demonstrating a rise in successful authoritarian practices by opportunistic, 
authoritarian leaders who identified political advantages in the health crisis. Leadership in 
Poland, Hungary, Turkmenistan, and the United States are examples of growing tendencies 
towards greater authoritarianism as a result of the pandemic. If this rightward trend can find a 
foothold in Denmark, where the right-wing Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti/DF) has 
been one of the country’s largest parties for some years now, and where DF has already had 
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success in using the immigration crisis as a springboard, then there is a greater potential for 
change in the Danish-Russian relationship. Denmark’s political culture makes the rise of 
authoritarianism there unlikely, in my opinion, but DF officials have expressed on record 
positions towards Russia and Nord Stream 2 that range from free-market indifference to open 
support. The defeat of Mette Frederiksen and the political center in a hypothetical election 
coming either during or soon after the coronavirus crisis could possibly lead to more Russia-
supportive leadership and open more doors in Europe for Russian energy.  
Regardless of what changes occur at the highest level of Danish politics in connection 
with the crisis, Denmark may find itself in an advantageous trade position, perhaps with other 
trade partners as well but specifically with Russia. Denmark is a large exporter of 
pharmaceuticals and medical supplies, and Russia in particular is a large importer of these 
supplies from Denmark – this industry was identified as a target for expansion in the Russian 
market strategy published by Helle Thorning-Schmidt’s government in 2012. Though the 
Russian government entered the global crisis from a position of denial and spent the first quarter 
of 2020 reporting suspiciously low numbers of coronavirus cases in tandem with suspiciously 
high numbers of pneumonia cases, by mid-April it began to admit that Russia was also suffering 
severe damage from the virus.306 As Denmark is set to begin reopening the country earlier than 
many of its neighbors in the EU, this could potentially put it in the position to take greater 
advantage of regional demand for medical supplies, especially as Russia looks set to experience 
even greater upticks in disease cases. 
 
306 Tsvetkova and Ivanova 2020; Higgins 2020. 
123 
 
 
 
The spring of 2020 also saw oil prices around the world plummet to devastatingly low 
levels; the price per barrel for Russian oil is, as of May 2020, significantly lower than what 
Russian oil companies require to break even.307 It is estimated that low prices, reduced demand 
for oil in Europe as a result of the coronavirus crisis, and the deep production cut Russia agreed 
to, in a nominal truce with Saudi Arabia in the two countries’ oil price war, will lead to the loss 
of at least one million jobs in Russia and a huge leap in unemployment.308 These factors may 
trigger a recession in Russia and will very likely reduce the amount of energy-based leverage 
Russia can wield, at least in the short term, over partners or adversaries in Europe. This may in 
turn lead to a significant shift in power dynamics between Russia and Europe, especially 
depending on how well major European partners (Germany, for example) are able to insulate 
themselves against the global economic downturn.  
Denmark is presently poised to reopen its economy, much earlier than its neighbors. If 
successful this could lead to a resurgence, albeit a small one, of gas and oil demand from 
Denmark, as people regain the ability to move around the country and commute traffic increases 
again to its former levels; a successful reopening in Denmark could also potentially prompt other 
neighboring countries to reopen sooner, thus returning some of the lost demand for Russian 
energy in Europe and placing the onus for cooperation upon Russia. 
Political and economic ramifications of the coronavirus are brand-new factors into 
international relations forecasts, but the crisis will be, and indeed already is, a defining moment 
for politicians and international relationships around the world. Consequently, political results in 
the short term will depend in many cases upon political responses to the crisis, and Denmark will 
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be no exception. Developments in Danish politics will in turn influence how the country interacts 
with Russia. On Russia’s end of things, the short- and long-term effects of the current global 
crisis upon its energy industry (specifically oil) and its political leadership, particularly the 
support it can ultimately command of the Russian population, will be most meaningful in 
dictating both the direction of the country and the trajectory of its relationship towards and with 
Denmark.  
In the final analysis, however, Russia will in the long-term continue to be victimized by 
its geography. The reality of its foreign policy goals, energy policy goals, and national defense 
goals all depend upon the reality of its geography; major theaters for all of these goals include 
the Arctic and the Baltic Seas. In both cases, Denmark serves as a gatekeeper. The consequence 
of this for Russia is that Russia must take greater account of its neighbor across the Baltic, 
especially given that each country is pursuing its own respective policy goals, which are often 
incompatible with the goals of the other, in one shared space. As long as the relationship between 
Russia and Denmark remains contentious and lacking in mutual respect, the relationship and 
physical spaces where it plays out will remain a tinderbox quick to spark conflict. 
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Appendices 
Chronology of Denmark’s governments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PERIOD PRIME MINISTER COALITION 
3 June 1988 – 18 December 1990 Poul Schlüter III K-V-RV 
18 December 1990 – 25 January 1993 Poul Schlüter IV K-V 
25 January 1993 – 27 September 1994 Poul Nyrup Rasmussen I S-CD-RV-KD 
27 September 1994 – 30 December 1996 Poul Nyrup Rasmussen II S-CD-RV 
30 December 1996 – 23 March 1998 Poul Nyrup Rasmussen III S-RV 
23 March 1998 – 27 November 2001 Poul Nyrup Rasmussen IV S-RV 
27 November 2001 – 18 February 2005 Anders Fogh Rasmussen I V-K 
18 February 2005 – 23 November 2007 Anders Fogh Rasmussen II V-K 
23 November 2007 – 5 April 2009 Anders Fogh Rasmussen III V-K 
5 April 2009 – 3 October 2011 Lars Løkke Rasmussen I V-K 
3 October 2011 – 3 February 2014 Helle Thorning-Schmidt I S-RV-SF 
3 February 2014 – 28 June 2015 Helle Thorning-Schmidt II S-RV 
28 June 2015 – 28 November 2016 Lars Løkke Rasmussen II V 
28 November 2016 – 27 June 2019 Lars Løkke Rasmussen III V-LA-K 
27 June 2019 – present (May 2020) Mette Frederiksen I S 
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Guide to Danish political parties 
 (Currently represented in the Danish parliament, as of May 2020) 
 
NAME (Danish) NAME (English) LETTER IDEOLOGY 
Socialdemokratiet Social Democrats S Social democracy; center-left 
Venstre Left V Liberalism; center-right 
Dansk Folkeparti Danish People’s Party DF National conservative; right-wing 
Radikale Venstre Radical Left RV Social liberalism; center 
Socialistisk Folkeparti Socialist People’s Party SF Popular socialism; center-left/left-wing 
Enhedslisten The Unity List EL Socialism; left-wing 
Konservative Folkeparti Conservative People’s Party KF Conservative; center-right 
Alternativet The Alternative ALT Green politics; center-left 
Nye Borgerlige New Bourgeois D National conservative; right-wing 
Liberal Alliance Liberal Alliance LA Liberalism; center-right 
Inuit Ataqatigiit Community of the People IA Socialism; left-wing (Greenlandic) 
Siumut Forward SIU 
Social democracy; center-left 
(Greenlandic) 
Sambandsflokkurin Unionist Party SP Liberalism; center-right (Faeroese) 
Javnaðarflokkurin Equality Party JF Social democracy; center-left (Faeroese) 
 
Maps 
 
I. Denmark.309 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
309 Geology n.d. 
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II. Baltic Sea Region.310 
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III. Arctic coast countries.311 
  
 
311 Geology n.d. 
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IV. Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines.312 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. Russian gas pipelines to Europe.313 
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